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1 Introduction
Throughout our lives, we are constantly receiving new information about ourselves and our en-
vironment. The way that we filter, summarize and store this new information is of critical im-
portance for the quality of our decision making. Theories of human behavior under dynamic
uncertainty are therefore enriched by an understanding of how individuals process new infor-
mation. Economists typically write down models where information is summarized in the form
of probabilistic ‘beliefs’ over states of the world, and updated upon receipt of new information
according to Bayes’ rule. However, the assumption that individuals process information in a sta-
tistically accurate way is receiving an increasing amount of attention, with many studies docu-
menting systematic deviations.1 One important strand of this literature examines whether belief
formation and updating is influenced by the aﬀective content of the new information2, i.e. whether
individuals update their beliefs symmetrically in response to ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’ (see, for
example, Eil and Rao (2011); Ertac (2011); Möbius et al. (2014); Coutts (2019)).3
Essentially, this literature tests an implicit assumption of Bayesian updating, namely that the only
object that is relevant for predicting an individual’s belief is her information set, and therefore
her beliefs are completely unaﬀected by the prizes and punishments she will receive in diﬀerent
states of the world. This fundamental assumption - that people update their beliefs symmetrically
- is of paramount importance because it underpins the results of a wide range of theoretical
studies within economics, including all research in which agents receive new information and
form rational expectations. As noted by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), since Muth (1960,
1961) and Lucas (1976), the vast majority of economic research involving uncertainty has built
on the rational expectations assumption, with diverse applications including the vast literatures on
social learning (see, for example, Chamley (2004) for a review), capital markets (e.g. Fama (1970,
1976)), intertemporal portfolio choice problems (e.g. Mossin (1968); Merton (1969); Samuelson
(1969); Lewellen and Shanken (2002)) and consumption savings problems (e.g. Friedman (1957);
Hall (1978)). Therefore, it is essential to empirically test whether the assumption that people
form beliefs symmetrically in response to ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’, such that their posterior
1Some notable examples include the representativeness bias (Grether, 1978, 1980, 1992), cognitive dissonance
(Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), anticipatory utility (Loewenstein, 1987; Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Brunnermeier and
Parker, 2005), base rate neglect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Holt and Smith, 2009), confirmatory bias (Rabin and
Schrag, 1999), motivated belief formation (Benabou and Tirole, 2002), correlation neglect (Enke and Zimmermann,
2019), and selection neglect (Esponda and Vespa, 2018; Barron et al., 2019; Enke, 2019).
2As an indication of the importance of this strand of the literature, in their recent paper taking stock of the current
state of the motivated reasoning literature, Bénabou and Tirole (2016) point to asymmetric updating as one of the
main testable implications of motivated reasoning.
3This literature takes inspiration from of the fact that, in many circumstances, individuals seem to display op-
timistic or overconfident beliefs (see, e.g., Malmendier and Taylor (2015) and other papers in the “Symposium on
Overconfidence” in the Fall 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives). This leads naturally to the question
of how these beliefs are sustained when receiving a constant stream of feedback. One potential explanation for opti-
mistically biased beliefs persisting in the face of feedback is that belief updating operates asymmetrically in response
to ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’.
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beliefs are completely unaﬀected by their hopes andwishes, is consistent with how belief updating
actually works.
With this objective in mind, in this paper we employ a laboratory experiment to study how in-
dividuals update their beliefs from exogenously assigned prior beliefs in a two-state world when
they receive a sequence of partially informative binary signals. In particular, we vary the financial
rewards associated with one of the two states of the world in order to test whether these state-
contingent financial rewards influence belief updating. A nice feature of this experimental design
is that it allows us to compare posterior beliefs in situations where the entire information set is
held constant, but the rewards associated with the states of the world are varied. For example,
we can compare how two groups of individuals revise their beliefs when both groups share the
same prior belief and receive an equally informative signal, but for one group of individuals the
signal is ‘good news’ and for others the signal constitutes ‘bad news’. Furthermore, we can con-
duct a similar exercise for a single individual, by comparing two situations in which she has the
same information set, and receives the same signal, but the signal consistutes ‘good news’ in one
instance, and ‘bad news’ in the other. Our experimental design therefore permits a clean test of
the asymmetric updating hypothesis.
In our experiment we study belief updating in two contexts. In our symmetric treatment, we
examine how subjects update their beliefs when they have an equal stake in each of the underlying
states and are therefore indiﬀerent about which state is realized. We compare this with updating
behavior in our two asymmetric treatments, in which a larger bonus payment will be paid if one
state of the world is realized. Here, one would expect that subjects prefer that the state with the
bonus payment is realized. In all treatments, subjects are told the true prior probability of the two
states, and then update their beliefs upon receipt of a sequence of informative but noisy signals.4
We elicit this sequence of beliefs. In our experiment, we can therefore conduct two separate tests
of the asymmetric updating hypothesis. Firstly, we can compare how the same individual responds
to ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’ within the asymmetric treatments. Secondly, we can conduct
a between-subject comparison of belief updating in the symmetric treatment and asymmetric
treatments. Each individual in our experiment faces only one incentive environment. However,
since we exogenously endow participants with a prior over the states of the world, we are able to
repeat the exercise several times for each individual and study how they update from each of five
diﬀerent priors, p0, chosen from the set {
1
6 ,
2
6 ,
3
6 ,
4
6 ,
5
6}.
The experimental design and analysis aim to address several challenges that are present when
studying belief updating in the presence of state dependent stakes. Firstly, we use exogenous
variation in the priors to ensure that the estimates are robust to the econometric issues that arise
when a right-hand side variable (i.e. the prior) is a lagged version of the dependent variable (i.e.
4The asymmetric treatments correspond to the setup studied in Möbius et al. (2014) and Eil and Rao (2011),
where a ‘good’ underlying state is being higher in the IQ or attractiveness distribution in relation to the other partic-
ipants in the experiment.
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the posterior). Secondly, we avoid a second type of endogeneity issue, which arises when the
underlying states are defined as a function of some personal characteristic of the individual (e.g.
her relative IQ) that might also be related to how she updates (see Appendix C for further details).
Thirdly, we measure the influence that hedging has on belief elicitation when there are state-
dependent stakes. Furthermore, we conduct several exercises to correct our estimates for this
hedging influence - both experimentally, and econometrically. Fourth, our experimental design
allows us to study belief updating from priors spanning much of the unit interval. Importantly,
averaging across all subjects, the design generates a balanced distribution of ‘good’ and ‘bad’
signals.
The empirical strategy employed permits testing for several commonly hypothesised deviations
from Bayesian updating, including confirmatory bias and base rate neglect, however the focus of
both the experimental design, and the analysis, is on testing for the presence of an asymmetry in
updating. Our results show no evidence in favour of asymmetric updating in response to ‘good-
news’ in comparison to ‘bad-news’ in the domain of financial outcomes (when there is a minimal
role for ego-utility). Several robustness exercises are carried out in support of this conclusion.
Furthermore, we find that average updating behavior is well approximated by Bayes’ rule.5 This
average behavior masks substantial heterogeneity in updating behavior at the individual level,
but we find no evidence in support of a sizeable subgroup of asymmetric updators.
The evidence reported here contributes to the recent literature studying the asymmetric updat-
ing hypothesis across diﬀerent contexts (Eil and Rao (2011), Ertac (2011), Grossman and Owens
(2012), Mayraz (2013), Möbius et al. (2014), Kuhnen (2015), Schwardmann and Van der Weele
(2016), Gotthard-Real (2017) Charness and Dave (2017), Heger and Papageorge (2018), Coutts
(2019) and Buser et al. (2018)). The results in this literature thus far are surprisingly hetero-
geneous, with some papers finding an greater responsiveness to good-news; some a greater re-
sponsiveness to bad-news; and some no evidence of an asymmetry.6 There are several candidate
contextual and experimental design factors that could potentially be driving these heterogeneous
results. Section 7 oﬀers a detailed discussion of these factors, and asks whether the existing body
of evidence can help us to detect a systematic pattern that organises the results (for an alterna-
tive discussion of this literature, see Benjamin (2019), who taxonomizes the existing evidence on
errors in probabilistic reasoning).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework,
Section 3 details the experimental design, Section 4 provides some descriptive statistics, Section
5 presents the empirical specification, Section 6 discusses the related literature and Section 7
concludes.
5This is in line with Holt and Smith (2009) and Coutts (2019), who find that average posteriors across all indi-
viduals are well approximated by posteriors obtained by applying Bayes’ rule.
6See the Discussion section below for further details.
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2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
In the following section, we discuss a simple framework for belief updating that augments the
standard benchmark of Bayesian updating by allowing for several of the deviations from Bayes’
rule commonly discussed in the psychology and related economics literature. This framework is
borrowed from Möbius et al. (2014) and is currently a common approach used in this type of
descriptive belief updating study. The basic idea is that, while Bayes’ rule captures the normative
benchmark for how we might think a rational agent should update her beliefs7, it has been argued
that, descriptively, people may update their beliefs in ways that depart systematically from Bayes’
rule.8 The framework below serves to facilitate a discussion of these diﬀerent potential deviations,
and motivates the empirical approach that we will use to test whether they are observed in our
data.
In short, below we describe a model that embeds the normative Bayesian benchmark, but also
allows for commonly discussed belief updating distortions. The aim will be to then make use
of this model to test whether subjects update their beliefs like a Bayesian automaton or display
some systematic deviations from this Bayesian benchmark. Most importantly, the model permits
a discussion of what observed updating behavior should look like if agents update their beliefs
asymmetrically in response to ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’.
2.1 A Simple Model of Belief Formation
We consider a single agent who forms a belief over two states of the world, ω ∈ {A,B}, at each
point in time, t. One of these states of the world is selected by nature as the ‘correct’ (or ‘realized’)
state, where state ω = A is chosen with prior probability p¯0 (known to the agent). The agent’s
belief at time t is denoted by πt ∈ [0, 1], where πt is the agent’s belief regarding the likelihood that
the state is ω = A and 1−πt is the agent’s belief that the state is ω = B. In each period, the agent
receives a signal, st ∈ {a, b}, regarding the state of the world, which is correct with probability
q ∈ (12 , 1). In other words, p(a|A) = p(b|B) = q >
1
2 . Furthermore, the history, Ht, is defined
7This statement is not uncontentious. One argument in favor of using Bayes’ rule as a normative benchmark
for belief updating is that Bayes’ rule captures the objective statistical relationship between a prior probability and
a posterior probability, given new information. Therefore, if an individual updates her beliefs according to Bayes’
rule, she will always hold beliefs that are as accurate as possible, given her information set. This will allow her
to use these optimal beliefs to guide her decision making. However, this argument that Bayes’ rule represents the
normative optimum rests on the assumption that beliefs serve only an instrumental role in guiding decision making.
If, for example, we relax this assumption and allow beliefs to yield intrinsic utility, then this argument no longer
holds as it may be optimal for the decision maker to hold beliefs that are distorted away from the Bayesian posterior.
8One argument used to justify the use of Bayes’ rule in descriptive models of human behavior is that evolution
should have selected individuals who were able to process new information in a statistically eﬃcient way over indi-
viduals who could not. Therefore, Bayesian individuals would have had more accurate beliefs guiding their decision
making, and been more likely to survive.
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as the sequence of signals received by the agent in periods 1, . . . , t, with H0 = ∅. Therefore, the
history at time t is given by Ht = (s1, ..., st).
In order to study how individuals update their beliefs, we follow Möbius et al. (2014) in consid-
ering the following model of augmented Bayesian updating:9
logit(πt+1) = δlogit(πt) + γa log(
q
1− q
) · 1(st+1 = a)− γb log(
q
1− q
) · 1(st+1 = b) (1)
The parameters δ, γa and γb serve, firstly, to provide structure for a discussion of diﬀerent ways in
which our agent may depart from Bayesian updating, and secondly, to provide a clear prescription
for how to test for these departures in our empirical analysis below.
If δ = γa = γb = 1 then the agent updates her beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. However, if
we consider deviations from this benchmark, we see that δ captures the degree to which the
magnitude of the agent’s prior aﬀects her updating. For example, if δ > 1 then this suggests
that the agent displays a confirmatory bias10, whereby she is more responsive to information
that supports her prior. In contrast, δ < 1 suggests she is more responsive to information that
contradicts her prior (i.e. base rate neglect11). The former would predict that beliefs will polarize
over time, while the latter would predict that over time beliefs remain closer to 0.5 in a two-state
world than Bayes’ rule would predict.
The parameters, γa and γb capture the agent’s responsiveness to information. If γa = γb < 1 then
the agent is less responsive to the information that she receives than a Bayesian updater would
be. And if γa = γb > 1, then she is more responsive than a Bayesian. For example, if γa = 2,
then whenever the agent receives a signal st = a, she updates her belief exactly as much as a
Bayesian would if he received two a signals, st = {a, a}. The interpretation of the parameters is
summarized in the first five rows of Table 1 below.
9For a discussion of core properties underlying Bayes’ rule, see Appendix B.1. This discussion serves as amotivation
for the approach taken in augmenting Bayes’ rule in equation 1. For further details regarding the derivation of
equation 1, refer to an earlier working paper version of this paper (Barron, 2018), or refer to the comprehensive
survey of this topic provided by Benjamin (2019).
10For a detailed discussion of the confirmatory bias, see Rabin and Schrag (1999). Essentially, it is the tendency
to weight information that supports one’s priors more heavily than information that opposes one’s priors. In this
case, when one’s prior regarding state ω = A is greater than 0.5, i.e. πt > 0.5, a participant who is prone to the
confirmatory bias weights signals that support state ω = A more heavily than signals that support state ω = B; and
vice versa when her prior suggests state ω = B is more likely, i.e. πt < 0.5.
11One can think of base rate neglect in this context as the agent forming her beliefs as if she attenuates the influence
of her prior belief when calculating her posterior - i.e. acting as if her prior was closer to 0.5 than it actually was.
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Table 1: Interpretation of Parameters: A Summary
Belief Updating Distortion Parameter Values
Bayesian Updating δ = 1, γa = 1 and γb = 1
Confirmatory Bias δ > 1
Base Rate Neglect δ < 1
Conservatism γj < 1 for ∀j ∈ {a, b}
Overresponsiveness γj > 1 for ∀j ∈ {a, b}
Optimistic updating (in ASYMMETRIC) γa > γb
Pessimistic updating (in ASYMMETRIC) γa < γb
Aﬀective States
The discussion in the preceding section has so far focused on purely cognitive deviations from
Bayes’ rule. The aﬀect or desirability of diﬀerent states of the world has played no role. However,
in most situations in which individuals form beliefs, there are some states that yield an outcome
that is preferred to the outcomes associated with other states - i.e. there are good and bad states
of the world. For example, an individual would generally prefer to be more intelligent rather than
less intelligent, to win a lottery rather than lose, and for the price of assets in her possession to
increase rather than decrease. This implies that new information about the state of the world is
also often either good-news or bad-news.
In order to allow for the possibility that individuals update their beliefs diﬀerently in response to
good-news in comparison to bad-news, we relax the assumption that belief updating is orthogonal
to the aﬀect of the information.12 To do this, assume that each of the two states of the world is
associated with a certain outcome—i.e. in state ω = A, the agent receives outcome xA, and in
state ω = B, she receives xB. There are now two belief updating scenarios:
• Scenario 1 (symmetric): the agent is indiﬀerent between outcomes (i.e. xA ∼ xB ); and
• Scenario 2 (asymmetric): the agent strictly prefers one of the two outcomes (i.e. xA ≻ xB).
Now, the question of interest is whether the agent will update her beliefs diﬀerently in the sym-
metric and asymmetric scenarios. Under the assumption that the agent’s behavior is consistent
with the model described above in Equation 1, this involves asking whether the parameters δ,γa
and γb, diﬀer between the two contexts.
To guide our discussion, we consider the following two benchmarks. The first natural benchmark
is Bayes’ rule, which prescribes that all three parameters equal 1 in both the symmetric and
12To avoid ambiguity, in the discussion below, the term ‘preference’ is usually used to refer to preferences over sure
outcomes—never to a preference ordering over lotteries. We will also sometimes refer to ‘preferring’ one state of the
world to another. This simply captures the idea that an individual prefers the realisation of a state in which a good
outcome is realised.
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asymmetric contexts—statistically eﬃcient updating of probabilities is unaﬀected by the state-
dependent rewards and punishments. According to Bayes’ rule, news is news, independent of its
aﬀective content.
Hypothesis 1 (Bayesian Updating) Individuals update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. There-
fore, δ = 1,γa = 1 and γb = 1 in both symmetric and asymmetric scenarios.
The second benchmark that we consider is the asymmetric updating hypothesis—that individuals
respond more to ‘good-news’ than ‘bad-news’. Here, in our simple framework there are two ways
to identify asymmetric updating.
Firstly, if we only consider the behavior of individuals within the asymmetric scenario, we can
ask whether there is an asymmetry in updating after signals that favor the more desirable state
ω = A (‘good-news’), relative to signals that favor the less desirable state ω = B (‘bad-news’). For
example, if γa > γb, this would indicate that the agent updates more in response to ‘good-news’.
We refer to such an agent as an optimistic updater. Conversely, if we have γa < γb then the agent
updates more in response to ‘bad-news’. We refer to such an agent as a pessimistic updater.13
Secondly, if we compare behavior between the symmetric and asymmetric scenarios, we can
ask whether the parameters of equation 1 diﬀer according to the scenario. We use the postscript
c ∈ {A, S} to distinguish the parameters in the two scenarios—i.e. δS,γSa and γ
S
b in symmetric
and δA,γAa and γ
A
b in asymmetric. In the symmetric treatment, where the agent is completely
indiﬀerent between the two states, there is no reason to expect her updating to be asymmetric.
Therefore, we assume that γSa = γ
S
b = γ
S. Thus, the diﬀerence γAa − γ
S
a reflects a measure
of the increase in the agent’s responsiveness when information is desirable, relative to when
information is neutral in terms of its aﬀect. Similarly, γAb − γ
S
b is a measure of the increase in the
agent’s responsiveness when information is undesirable, relative to the case in which information
is neutral in aﬀect.
Hypothesis 2 (Asymmetric Updating) Individuals update their beliefs asymmetrically, responding
more to good than bad news. Therefore, within the asymmetric scenario, we will observe γAa > γ
A
b .
And in a comparison between the symmetric and asymmetric scenarios, we will observe γAa − γ
S
a > 0
and γAb − γ
S
b < 0. Together, we can summarize the asymmetric updating hypothesis parameter
predictions as follows: γAa > γ
S > γAb .
13Notice that these definitions of optimistic and pessimistic updating relate only to the asymmetry in responsiveness
to signals supporting diﬀerent states, but depend on how responsive the agent is to the signals she receives relative
to Bayes’ rule. Therefore, under the definition given, we can have an optimistic updater who is less responsive to
signals supporting the desirable state than a Bayesian (i.e. 1 > γa > γb). This agent is less responsive than a Bayesian
to both desirable and undesirable information, but more responsive to desirable information relative to undesirable
information.
In our experiment, we will provide evidence on both of these questions. Firstly, we will exam-
ine whether there is an asymmetry in updating behavior within the asymmetric context; and
secondly, we will examine whether the parameters of the updating process diﬀer between the
symmetric and the asymmetric contexts, in a between subjects comparison. Furthermore, our
experiment will allow us to test for other systematic deviations from Bayes’ rule, such as those
mentioned in the discussion above. Table 1 summarizes the interpretations of the diﬀerent values
that the belief updating parameters may take.
2.2 Belief Elicitation and Incentives
In order to empirically test the hypotheses above using an experiment, we would like to be able to
elicit our participants’ true beliefs. One common feature of many studies using belief elicitation
is to assume that participants evaluate prospects using a specific model, and then to show that
under the incentives of the elicitation technique, a participant who is following the assumedmodel
should report her true belief (i.e. under the model, truthful revelation is incentive compatible).
However, in the context of studying the relationship between preferences and beliefs, two con-
cerns may be raised regarding this approach: firstly, the assumption that participants follow ex-
pected utility involves a stronger assumption than we might wish to make; and secondly, the
inherent hedging motive faced by participants who have a stake in one state of the world poses
an additional challenge (see Karni and Safra (1995) for a discussion). Therefore we adopt the
approach developed by Oﬀerman et al. (2009), and extended to accommodate state-dependent
stakes as in Kothiyal et al. (2011).
The central idea behind this approach is to acknowledge that the incentive environment within
which we elicit beliefs in the laboratory may exert a distortionary influence on the beliefs which
some participants report, relative to the beliefs they actually hold, and then measure this dis-
tortionary influence of the incentive environment in a separate part of the experiment. Once we
have constructed a mapping from true beliefs to reported beliefs within the relevant incentive
environment, we can use this function to recover the participant’s true beliefs from her reported
beliefs. In other words, our objective is to recover the function that each individual uses to map
her true beliefs to the beliefs that she reports within the given incentive environment.
The incentive environment that we will use in our experiment to elicit beliefs is the quadratic
scoring rule (QSR).14 In Appendix B.2, we provide a detailed discussion of way in which reported
14There are several reasons for adopting this approach: firstly, the QSR has the advantage that it ensures that the
decision environment is clear and simple for the participants - essentially they are making a single choice from a
list of binary prospects; secondly, the quadratic scoring rule has been commonly used in the literature, with both
the theoretical properties and empirical performance having been studied in detail (see, e.g., Armantier and Treich
(2013)); thirdly, in a horse race between elicitation methods, Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) show that
there is no improvement in the empirical performance of more complex elicitation methods over the Oﬀerman et al.
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beliefs might be distorted under the quadratic scoring rule, depending on the assumed underlying
model of preferences. A key example is that it is well documented under the QSR a risk averse
agent should distort their reported belief towards 50%. However, this is only true in the absence
of state-dependent stakes. In our experiment, we will also be interested in eliciting beliefs when
participants have an exogenous stake associated with one of the two states.
In the context of state-dependant stakes, a risk averse EU maximizer will face two distortionary
motives in reporting her belief: (i) she will face the motive to distort her belief towards 50% as
discussed above; and (ii) in addition, there is a hedging motive, which will compel a risk averse
individual to lower her reported belief, rt, towards 0% as the size of the exogenous stake increases
increases.15
If the participants in our experiment are risk neutral expected utility maximizers, the reported
beliefs, rt, that we elicit under the QSR will coincide with their true beliefs, πt. However, in order
to allow for choice behavior consistent with a wider range of decision models, we measure the
size of the distortionary influence of the elicitation incentives at an individual level and correct
the beliefs accordingly.
A Non-EU ‘Truth Serum’
The Oﬀerman et al. (2009) approach proposes correcting the reported beliefs for the risk aversion
caused by the curvature of the utility function or by non-linear probability weighting. This ap-
proach involves eliciting participants’ reported belief parameter, r, for a set of risky events where
they know the objective probability, p (known probability). This is done under precisely the same
QSR incentive environment in which the participants’ subjective beliefs, π, regarding the events
of interest (where they don’t know the objective probability: unknown probability) are elicited. If
a subject’s reported beliefs, r, diﬀer from the known objective probabilities, p, this indicates that
the subject is distorting her beliefs due to the incentive environment (e.g. due to risk aversion).
The objective of the correction mechanism is therefore to construct a map, R, from the objec-
tive beliefs, p ∈ [0, 1], to the reported beliefs, r, for each individual under the relevant incentive
environment.
In Appendix B.2, we oﬀer a detailed discussion of how the Oﬀerman et al. (2009) method oper-
ates, describe the underlying assumptions, and demonstrate how it can be augmented (as pro-
(2009) method, neither in terms of internal validity, nor in terms of behavior prediction. Out of the set of alternative
elicitation techniques, the two that are most theoretically attractive are, the binarized scoring rule, proposed by
Hossain and Okui (2013), and the probability matching mechanism, described by Grether (1992) and Karni (2009).
However, in the context of the current paper, we viewed neither of these approaches as being preferable to the
Oﬀerman et al. (2009) technique, since both of these approaches introduce an additional layer of probabilities and
in the study of probability bias, this is an undesirable attribute of the elicitation strategy.
15This assumes that the state-dependent payment is associated with the 100% state, not the 0% state. This as-
sumption is made throughout the paper and the experiment.
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posed in Kothiyal et al. (2011)) to allow for the scenario where there are state-contingent stakes
(i.e. x ≠ 0).
3 Experimental Design
The experiment was designed to test the asymmetric updating hypothesis using both within-
subject and between-subjects comparisons of updating behavior. The experiment consisted of
three treatment groups. The treatment T1.Symmetric corresponds to Scenario 1 (symmetric:
no exogenous state-contingent stakes) and the other two treatment groups, T2.Combined and
T3.Separate, correspond to Scenario 2 (asymmetric: state-contingent stakes) discussed above.
In T1.Symmetric, one would expect the participants to be indiﬀerent between each of the two
states being realized, while in T2.Combined and T3.Separate, the larger payment associated
with state ω = A should imply that the participants prefer that this state be realized. T2.Combined
and T3.Separate are identical in terms of the financial incentives. The rationale for running two
treatments with identical incentives was to conduct additional checks to ensure that our results
were not driven by the influence of a hedging motive as discussed above. To do this, we varied
only the way that the incentive environment was described to participants (i.e. we only varied the
framing of the incentives). In T2.Combined, this information was summarized in a way that made
it much easier for participants to notice the hedging opportunity in comparison to T3.Separate.
This exogenous variation in the salience of the hedging opportunity served two purposes. Firstly,
it allowed us to assess whether a hedging motive influenced the beliefs elicited. Secondly, it pro-
vided an opportunity to assess the validity of the mechanism we use to correct reported beliefs.16
The diﬀerence between these two treatments is discussed in more detail in the ‘Incentives and
Treatment Groups’ section below.
The experiment proceeded in three stages. The first stage comprised the core belief updating
task in which we elicited a sequence of reported beliefs from subjects as they received a sequence
of noisy signals regarding the true state of the world, updating from an exogenously provided
prior. In the second stage we collected the reported probabilities associated with known objective
probabilities on the interval [0, 1] required for the Oﬀerman et al. (2009) correction approach,
as well as data on risk preferences. In the third stage, we obtained data on several demographic
characteristics as well as some further non-incentivized measures. In each of the first two stages,
16This approach of varying the transparency of the hedging opportunity in order to evaluate the comparative static
influence of the salience of hedging in practical applications in the laboratory echoes Blanco et al. (2010), who study
whether hedging is a problem for belief elicitation in the lab. The authors conclude that it is when the hedging
opportunity is salient. We will discuss the relation between our results and theirs in more detail in the Discussion
section.
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one of the subject’s choices was chosen at random and paid out. In addition the participants
received a fixed fee of £5 [e5] for completing Stage 3, as well as a show-up fee of £5 [e5].17
The Belief Updating Task (Stage 1)
The Belief Updating Task was the primary task of the experiment. We used this task to collect data
about participants’ belief updating behaviour. The experimental design for this task is summarized
in Figure 1 and described in the following discussion.
Figure 1: Overview of Experimental Design
Computer / Nature [C/N] 
 
Participant [P] 
 
Urn Selection 
Ball Draw 1 
Ball Draw 2 
Belief Report 0 
Belief Report 1 
Urn: ω=A 
 
 
p0 1-p0 
   
    
    
    
    
        q=5/8 1-q=3/8 
Belief Reports 2,3,4,5 
Payoffs:  
Two Components 
Treatment 1 
Treatment 2 & 3 
QSR + £0.10 QSR + £0.10 
QSR + £10 QSR + £0.10 
Ball Draws 3, 4, 5 
Rounds: In each of the 5 rounds, the prior (p0) is chosen from the set {
1
6 ,
2
6 ,
3
6 ,
4
6 ,
5
6} 
 
Information: The prior (p0) and the observed sequence of balls drawn. 
Urn: ω=B 
          
    
    
1-q=3/8 q=5/8 
q=5/8 
q=5/8 
1-q=3/8 
1-q=3/8                 
      
Red 
Blue 
17In the discussion below, I will always refer only to Pounds (£), however in the experiments run at the Technical
University in Berlin all the payments were made in Euros. In all cases, the payment in Pounds (£) was equivalent to
the payment in Euros (e). In other words, £1 was replaced with e1. In terms of the cost of living in the two locations,
this seemed more appropriate than using the actual exchange rate. In addition, it had the benefit of keeping all the
quantities constant across locations.
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The Belief Updating Task consisted of five rounds. In each round, participants were presented
with a pair of computerized ‘urns’ containing blue and red colored balls, with each of these two
urns representing one of the two states of the world. The composition of the two urns was always
constant, with the state ω = A represented by the urn containing more blue balls (5 blue and 3
red), while the state ω = B was represented by the urn containing more red balls (5 red and 3
blue).
Priors
The five rounds diﬀered from one another only in the exogenous prior probability that ω = Awas
the true state, with this prior, p0, chosen from the set {
1
6 ,
2
6 ,
3
6 ,
4
6 ,
5
6}. In each round, this prior was
known to the participant. The order of these rounds was randomly chosen for each individual.
Conditional on the prior, p0, one of the two urns was then chosen through the throw of a virtual
die, independently for each individual, in each round.
Belief Updating
In each round, after being informed of this prior probability, p0, the participant received a se-
quence of five partially informative signals, st, for t = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. These signals consisted of
draws, with replacement, from the urn chosen for that round. Therefore, if the state of the world
in a specific round was ω = A then the chance of drawing a red ball was 38 and the chance of
drawing a blue ball was 58 for each of the draws in that round (see Figure 1).
In each round, we elicited the participant’s reported belief, rt, about the likelihood that state
ω = A was the correct state of the world, six times (i.e. for t = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). We first elicited
her reported belief, r0, directly after she was informed of the exogenous prior probability, p0, and
then after she received each of her five signals we elicited rt for t = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Overall, we
therefore elicited 30 reported beliefs in Stage 1 from each individual (6 reported beliefs in each
of 5 rounds).18
Incentives and Treatment Groups
The Belief Updating Task was identical across treatment groups with the exception of the in-
centives faced by participants. In each treatment, participants’ payment consisted of two compo-
nents: (i) an exogenous state-contingent payment19, and (ii) an accuracy payment that depended
18Participants were not informed about the correct urn at the end of each round. They only received feedback
when their payment was calculated at the very end of the experiment.
19This was called the “urn bonus” in the experiment.
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on their stated belief20 and the true state (i.e. the QSR payment described in equations 6 and 7
above). In treatments T2.Combined and T3.Separate, the state-contingent payment was sub-
stantially higher at £10 in state ω = A in comparison to £0.10 in state ω = B, making ω = A the
more attractive state of the world. In T1.Symmetric, participants simply received an equal state-
contingent payment of £0.10 in both states, ω = A and ω = B, implying neither was preferable.
In all three treatments, participants received nearly identical detailed written instructions de-
scribing the belief updating task as well as the two payment components. In order to further
simplify the task faced by participants and try to ensure that they understood the incentive en-
vironment they faced, we presented the QSR as a choice from a list of lotteries (this approach
is also used, for example, by Armantier and Treich (2013) and Oﬀerman et al. (2009)). To this
eﬀect, subjects were presented with payment tables, which informed them of the precise prospect
they would face for each choice of rt, in increments of 0.01. An abbreviated version of the three
payment tables associated with each of the three treatment groups is presented in Table 2.21 In
order to represent all payments as integers in the instructions and payment tables, we adopted
the approach of using experimental points. At the end of the experiment, these experimental
points were converted to money using an experimental exchange rate of 6000 points = £1.
Table 2 highlights the diﬀerence between treatments T2.Combined and T3.Separate. While,
participants in these two treatments faced precisely the same incentives, the treatments diﬀered
in terms the salience of the hedging motive. In particular, the only diﬀerence between the two
treatments was the way in which the payment information was summarised in the payment table.
As shown in Table 2, in T2.Combined, the payment table showed the combined payment from both
(i) the exogenous state-contingent payment, and (ii) the accuracy payment, together. Therefore,
it summarised the reduced form prospect associated with each reported probability choice (rt)
for subjects.
The motivation behind having two treatments with identical incentives, but a diﬀerent presen-
tation of the incentives, was following. The rationale for T2.Combined was that presenting the
incentives in a combined form is the simplest and clearest way of relaying the true incentives
faced to participants. The rationale for T3.Separate was that if participants “narrowly bracket”,
then the separate presentation of incentives could reduce the influence of the hedging motive,
and therefore would induce more accurate belief reporting. By implementing both treatments,
we were able to evaluate the influence of the presentation of the incentives on the reported beliefs.
As we will see below, this influence was substantial and corresponds to the theoretical predictions
for how a risk averse individual would act if she were hedgingmore when the hedging opportunity
20In the experiment, we refer to the object that individuals reported about the likelihood that one of the two urns
was the chosen one as their “probability judgment”. This corresponds to the reported belief in the discussion above.
21Note, these payment tables are abbreviated in comparison to the tables presented to participants. The only
substantive diﬀerence is that Table 2 contains 21 rows, one for each 5% increment in the reported belief. In contrast,
the participants received payment tables that contained 101 rows, one for each 1% increase in the reported belief.
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Table 2: Comparison of Incentive Summary Tables between Treatment Groups
T1 SYMMETRIC T2 COMBINED T3 SEPARATE
Probability
judgment for
Urn A
True Urn Probability
judgment for
Urn A
True Urn Probability
judgment for
Urn A
True Urn
Urn A Urn B Urn A Urn B Urn A Urn B
100 12 600 600 100 72 000 600 100 12 000 0
95 12 570 1 770 95 71 970 1 770 95 11 970 1 170
90 12 480 2 880 90 71 880 2 880 90 11 880 2 280
85 12 330 3 930 85 71 730 3 930 85 11 730 3 330
80 12 120 4 920 80 71 520 4 920 80 11 520 4 320
75 11 850 5 850 75 71 250 5 850 75 11 250 5 250
70 11 520 6 720 70 70 920 6 720 70 10 920 6 120
65 11 130 7 530 65 70 530 7 530 65 10 530 6 930
60 10 680 8 280 60 70 080 8 280 60 10 080 7 680
55 10 170 8 970 55 69 570 8 970 55 9 570 8 370
50 9 600 9 600 50 69 000 9 600 50 9 000 9 000
45 8 970 10 170 45 68 370 10 170 45 8 370 9 570
40 8 280 10 680 40 67 680 10 680 40 7 680 10 080
35 7 530 11 130 35 66 120 11 130 35 6 930 10 530
30 6 720 11 520 30 66 120 11 520 30 6 120 10 920
25 5 850 11 850 25 65 250 11 850 25 5 250 11 250
20 4 920 12 120 20 64 320 12 120 20 4 320 11 520
15 3 930 12 330 15 63 330 12 330 15 3 330 11 730
10 2 880 12 480 10 62 280 12 480 10 2 280 11 880
5 1 770 12 570 5 61 170 12 570 5 1 170 11 970
0 600 12 600 0 60 000 12 600 0 0 12 000
was made salient.
Furthermore, an additional benefit of running both treatments was that it provided us with a
way to test the internal validity of the correction mechanism we use. We will see below that,
while the uncorrected distribution of beliefs diﬀer substantially between the two treatments, the
distributions of the corrected beliefs are very similar to one another.
The Oﬀerman et al. (2009) Correction Task (Stage 2)
In the second stage of the experiment we elicited the twenty reported beliefs, r, for events with
known objective probabilities required to estimate the incentive distortion function, R, for each
individual. In each of the three treatments, we estimate the function R using belief from Stage 2
elicited under the same incentive environment as in the Belief Updating Task in Stage 1.
In Stage 2, participants were asked to report their probability judgment regarding the likelihood
that statements of the form: “the number the computer chooses will be between 1 and 75” (i.e.
p = 0.75), were true, after being told that the computer would randomly choose a number be-
tween 1 and 100, with each number equally probable. For T1.Symmetric, this specific example
of the probability of the randomly chosen number being in the interval between 1 and 75 es-
sentially involves choosing r from the list of prospects defined by 1 − (1 − r)20.75(1 − r2). For
T2.Combined and T3.Separate, this example would involve choosing r from the list of prospects
defined by x + 1 − (1 − r)20.75(1 − r2). As in Stage 1, in each of the treatments, the Stage 2
payment table summarized the relevant payment information. For each treatment, this payment
table contained identical values in Stage 1 and Stage 2. Therefore, Table 2 above also provides a
summary of the Stage 2 payment tables.
The twenty reported beliefs corresponded to the objective probabilities 0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.95.22 At
the end of the experiment, one choice from Stage 2 was randomly chosen to contribute to each
participant’s final payment.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
The experiment was conducted at the UCL-ELSE experimental laboratory in London as well as at
theWZB-TU laboratory in Berlin, with two sessions for each of the three Treatment groups at each
location, making twelve sessions and 222 participants in total.23 At both locations, participants
22These objective probabilities were presented in a random order. Furthermore, in the likelihood statement used,
such as the example in the main test, the interval given started at a randomly chosen lower bound (from the feasible
set of lower bounds for that specific objective probability). Nineteen of the twenty reported beliefs were unique, and
the twentieth was a randomly chosen repitition of one of the first nineteen.
23The experiment was therefore completely symmetric between the two locations, with approximately the same
number of participants in each treatment group from each location.
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were solicited through an online database using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was
run using the experimental software, z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). On average, sessions lasted
approximately 1.5 hours and the average participant earned £19.7 in London ande20.3 in Berlin.
Realized payments ranged between £11 [e11] and £34 [e34].
One challenge faced by belief updating studies is ensuring that subjects understand and engage
with the task. In order to facilitate this, we were careful to ensure that the instructions received
were as clear and simple as possible. Nonetheless, there remained a non-trivial fraction of partici-
pants who took decisions to update in the ‘incorrect’ direction24 upon receiving new information.
In order to ensure that the behavior we are studying is reflective of actual updating behavior
of individuals who understood and engaged with the task, we restrict our sample for our main
analysis by removing rounds where an individual updates in the incorrect direction.25 However,
we also estimate all the main results on the full sample, and the general patterns of behavior are
similar.
While randomization to treatment group should ensure that the samples are balanced on observ-
able and unobservable characteristics, Table 9 provides a check that the selection of our preferred
sample has not substantially biased our treatments groups by reporting the sample means of a
set of individual characteristics for each treatment group. Overall, the treatments appear to be
balanced, with the exception that individuals in T3.Separate are more likely to speak English at
home than individuals in T2.Combined.
5 Empirical Specification
In this section, we first discuss the calibration exercise used to correct the reported beliefs. Second,
we describe the core estimation equations used in our analysis. These build on the work byMöbius
et al. (2014) as their data has a similar structure to ours. One key diﬀerence in our data is the
exogenous assignment of the participants’ entire information set. We exploit this feature of our
data to address endogeneity issues that can arise when studying belief updating.
24‘Incorrect’ in the sense that the participant received a signal that increased the likelihood that one state was the
true state, but the individual updated her reported belief in the opposite direction. For example, if the individual
drew a red ball, but increased her reported belief regarding the probability that the state was ω = A, then we would
label this as an update in the incorrect direction.
25More specifically, for our preferred sample, we remove all individuals who make more than five out of twenty five
updating decisions in the incorrect direction. This comprised eighteen percent of our subjects. This is comparable to
the twenty five percent of individuals who make at least one mistake out of four decisions in Möbius et al. (2014).
For those who updated in the wrong direction five or fewer times, we remove only the round of decisions in which
they made a mistake. This removes 210 out of the remaining 910 rounds. We estimate our results on the full sample
and all the main results remain the same.
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The Belief Correction Procedure
The belief correction procedure that we adopt involves assuming a flexible parametric form for the
participants’ utility and probability weighting functions in order to estimate their personal belief-
distortion function (this is theR function discussed in Equation 8 in Appendix B.2.1). We estimate
this function for each individual separately in order to correct the reported beliefs at the individual
level. Essentially, we are simply fitting a curve through each subject’s belief elicitation distortion,
for the relevant incentive environment. Appendix B.2.4 contains a more detailed discussion of
the estimation of the belief correction function, and illustrates the main ideas through Figures 5
and 6. Figure 5 displays the average correction curves for each of the treatment groups across
all individuals. However, at the individual level, there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the
degree to which individuals distorted their reported belief away from their actual belief, given
the incentive environment. Figure 6 displays the correction curves estimated for two individuals
from each treatment group.
Figure 2: CDFs of Corrected and Uncorrected Reported Beliefs
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In Figure 2 we plot the CDFs of the uncorrected reported beliefs as well as the reported beliefs that
have been corrected at the individual level. The left panel displays the distribution of reported
beliefs, prior to correction, in each of the three treatments. One interesting feature of this figure
is that, in spite of the fact that subjects in T2.Combined and T3.Separate are oﬀered precisely
the same incentives, the distributions of reported beliefs of these two groups are significantly
diﬀerent from one another (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p < 0.01). The larger mass of reported
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beliefs to the left of 50 in T2.Combined suggests that individuals are more likely to respond to
the hedging opportunity when it is more salient.
This right panel shows the corrected beliefs. It suggests that the belief correction approach that
we use was successful in removing the strong hedging influence in the T2.Combined treatment
since the correction procedure removes the majority of the diﬀerence between the distributions
of beliefs between the two treatments with identical incentives, T2.Combined and T3.Separate.
This evidence underscores the usefulness of the belief correction mechanism in reducing the bias
in the reported beliefs, when there is a salient hedging opportunity.
With the corrected beliefs in hand, we can proceed to the main analysis of belief updating in our
sample. The analysis is done using both the corrected and uncorrected beliefs.26
Core Estimation Specifications
Our core estimation equations aim to test for systematic patterns in updating behavior, within the
framework developed in Equation 1. Firstly, we examine whether there are systematic deviations
from Bayes’ rule in updating behavior, independent of having a stake in one of the two states
of the world. Secondly, we assess the influence that having a stake in one of the two states
of the world has by (i) testing for an asymmetry in updating within treatments where there is
a state-contingent stake (i.e. T2.Combined and T3.Separate); and (ii) testing whether there
are diﬀerences in updating behavior between the treatments with and without a state-contingent
stake.
The first estimation equation follows directly from Equation 1, allowing us to test the asymmetric
updating hypothesis, and also to test for other common deviations from Bayes’ rule, such as a
confirmatory bias or base rate neglect27:
π˜i,j,t+1 = δπ˜i,j,t + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a)− γbq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + ϵi,j,t+1 (2)
where π˜i,j,t = logit(πi,j,t) and q˜ = log(
q
1−q ); j refers to a round of decisions; and the errors, ϵijt,
are clustered at the individual (i) level.
26The analysis using the uncorrected beliefs is essentially an analysis using beliefs elicited using the QSR, which
is by far the most common approach used in the belief elicitation literature to date. Therefore, these results have
greater comparability with much of the experimental literature. However, in line with the discussion above, our
preferred specification uses the corrected beliefs as these should be closer to the subjects’ true beliefs.
27Here, base rate neglect is the tendency to underweight or partially disregard one’s prior regarding which urn
is more likely to be generating the signal. This implies that when the individual receives a new signal, she weights
information that supports her prior less heavily than information that opposes it, relative to a Bayesian. In this case,
when one’s prior regarding state ω = A is greater than 0.5, πt−1 > 0.5, a participant who is prone to base rate neglect
weights signals that support state ω = A less heavily than signals that support state ω = B; and vice versa when her
prior is πt−1 < 0.5, using Bayesian updating as the benchmark.
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In order to determine the belief updating pattern within each incentive environment, we estimate
this equation separately for each treatment; and then to test for significant diﬀerences between the
coeﬃcients in diﬀerent incentive environments, we pool our sample and interact the treatment
variable with all three of the coeﬃcients in this equation (i.e. δ,γa, and γb). This provides us with
a test of whether the parameters diﬀer between either of the two asymmetric treatments and
the symmetric treatment.
Endogeneity of the Lagged Belief
One potential concern with the identification of the parameters of Equation 2 is the common issue
where the right hand side contains lagged versions of the dependent variable. This implies that
there is a possible endogeneity of the lagged beliefs, πi,j,t, if they are correlated with the error
term, E{π˜i,j,tϵi,j,t+1} ≠ 0.28 If this is the case, it can result in biased and inconsistent estimators
for the parameters of the regression. Our experiment was designed to avoid this issue by virtue of
exogenously assigning the subjects’ entire information set. This allows us to use the exogenously
assigned prior probability of state ω = A being the true state, pi,j,t=0, as well as the sequence of
signals observed, st, to construct an instrument for the lagged belief, πi,j,t, in Specification 2.29
We do this by calculating the objective Bayesian posterior, given the agent’s information set at
time t, and using this as an instrument for her belief, πi,j,t.
The approach used here also avoids a second type of endogeneity issue that can arise when
studying belief updating when the states of the world are a functions of personal characteristics
(e.g. when examining beliefs regarding individual attributes, such as one’s own skills, IQ, or
beauty) or personal choices. When this is the case, the conditional probability of observing a
specific signal depends on the state of the world, and therefore can be correlated with personal
characteristics.30
28For example, this would be the case if there is individual heterogeneity in the way individuals respond to infor-
mation. We provide evidence below that this individual heterogeneity is present.
29More precisely, we instrument using the logit of the accurate Bayesian posterior, logit(pi,j,t), as an instrument
for the logit of the lagged belief, π˜i,j,t = logit(πi,j,t) in Specification 2.
30Consider the following toy example to illustrate this. Assume there are two states of the world—being TALL and
SHORT—and being tall is viewed as “good”. Individuals are initially uncertain about their height group (because only
relative height is important). Now, assume that TALL individuals are more responsive to new information than SHORT
individuals. For example, assume TALL individuals update exactly according to Bayes’ rule, but SHORT individuals
don’t update their prior beliefs at all in response to new information. Now, let subjects receive a sequence of noisy
signals that are informative (in the sense that, for each type, the signal they receive is correct more than fifty percent
of the time). In this toy example, both types respond symmetrically to ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’, but because TALL
individuals are always more likely to receive ‘good-news’, and SHORT individuals are always more likely to receive
‘bad-news’, the resulting aggregate behavior will appear to display the “good-news, bad news eﬀect”. This is due to
the fact that, on average, a good signal was more likely received by a TALL individual, who updates like a Bayesian,
and a bad signal is more likely to go to a SHORT individual who doesn’t update at all. Furthermore, updating would
display conservatism on average. See Appendix C for further details.
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6 Results
Table 3 reports the results from estimating Equation 2 for each of the treatment groups separately.
These estimates provide an overview of the updating behavior of the average individual within
each of the three treatment groups. Within each treatment group, we report the results for both
the OLS (top panel) and the IV (bottom panel) estimates discussed above. Columns (1a), (2a) and
(3a) use the uncorrected reported beliefs, while columns (1b), (2b) and (3b) use the corrected
beliefs. Every coeﬃcient in the table is statistically diﬀerent from 0 at the 1% level. Since our
primary interest is in testing whether the coeﬃcients are diﬀerent from 1, in this table, we use
asterisks to reflect the significance of a t-test of whether a coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from
1.
Perhaps the most striking features of this table are: (i) the similarity in the updating patterns
across the three treatment groups; and (ii) that for the average individual, the observed updating
behavior is close to Bayesian in all three treatment groups. The p-values from the test of the
null hypothesis, H0 : γa = γb, show that in none of the three treatment groups do we observe a
statistically significant diﬀerence (at the 5% level) between the responsiveness to the signals in
favor of ω = A and ω = B (i.e. we don’t observe asymmetric updating).
Both the OLS results in the top panel, and the IV results in the bottom panel, indicate that the re-
sponsiveness to new information was, on average, not statistically diﬀerent to that of a Bayesian,
since both γa and γb are not significantly diﬀerent to 1 at the 5 percent level. The primary diﬀer-
ence between the OLS results and the IV results is that, while the OLS estimates suggest a small
degree of base rate neglect across all three treatments (δ < 1), once we control for the possible
sources of endogeneity discussed above using our instrumental variable strategy, the estimates
are no longer indicative of base rate neglect. Since the OLS estimates may be biased31, the IV
estimates represent our preferred results. The first stage regression results for the IV estimation
are reported in the Appendices in Table 8, indicating that we don’t have a weak instrument issue.
Importantly, however, the form of endogeneity addressed by IV estimation only pertains to po-
tential biases in the δ parameter, since it addresses endogeneity in the prior belief variable. It is
therefore reassuring that for the estimates of our primary parameters of interest, namely γa and
γb, the estimates are largely consistent across all the estimation specifications reported in Table 3.
A reason for this is that the signals, si,j,t+1, that subjects receive are always completely exogenous,
both across rounds, and with respect to the subject’s personal characteristics. Furthermore, the
distribution of signals observed is also exogenous, and balanced in expectation. This helps to
31As mentioned above, one candidate for biased estimates is due to the fact that the posterior belief at time t is
a left-hand-side variable in time t, but also serves as the right-hand-side variable through being the prior belief at
time t + 1. This can lead to biased estimates if there is individual heterogeneity in updating. Our instrumental
variable strategy uses the exogeneity of the priors and signals that subjects have been endowed with (summarized
as the objective Bayesian probability at that point in time) to instrument for their prior beliefs, thereby removing
this endogeneity of the prior beliefs in the regressions.
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avoid other sources of endogeneity (see, e.g., Appendix C) and to alleviate the influence of other
potential confounding belief updating biases (see the Discussion section below).
Table 3: Average Updating Behavior across Treatments
T1: SYMMETRIC T2: COMBINED T3: SEPARATE
Reported Corrected Reported Corrected Reported Corrected
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
OLS
δ 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.93
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)***
γa 1.12 1.09 1.05 1.06 1.25 1.16
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)* (0.11)
γb 1.21 1.17 1.19 1.12 1.20 1.13
(0.13)* (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10)
p (H0 : γa = γb) 0.30 0.32 0.20 0.48 0.58 0.73
N 1,075 1,075 1,285 1,285 1,140 1,140
R2 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.84
IV
δ 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
γa 1.12 1.09 1.08 1.02 1.22 1.14
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)* (0.11)
γb 1.21 1.16 1.11 1.12 1.18 1.11
(0.12)* (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10)
p (H0 : γa = γb) 0.30 0.31 0.76 0.25 0.63 0.74
N 1,075 1,075 1,285 1,285 1,140 1,140
1st Stage F 61.38 84.04 107.98 107.01 76.90 95.45
(i) Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
(ii) All coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 1% level. Therefore, t-tests of the null
hypothesis (H0: Coeﬃcient = 1) are reported: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
(iii) The rows corresponding to p (H0 : γa = γb) report the p-statistic from a t-test of the equality
of the coeﬃcients γa and γb (i.e. a test of the asymmetric updating hypothesis).
It is worth noticing that although we observe a substantial diﬀerence in the levels of the corrected
and uncorrected beliefs in Figure 2 above, the estimates for updating in Table 3 are quite similar
for the corrected and uncorrected beliefs. One explanation for this apparent inconsistency is the
following. If the degree of hedging by an individual is similar for both the prior and posterior
belief, then the correction could have a sizeable eﬀect on the levels of both beliefs, but not result in
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the large diﬀerence in the estimated updating parameters, since updating pertains to the change
in the belief rather than the level.
A Model Free Test of the Asymmetric Updating Hypothesis
In order to alleviate the potential concern that these results are dependent on the functional
form of our empirical specification, we conduct a model-free test of the the asymmetric updating
hypothesis. Perhaps the simplest and most direct test of this hypothesis is obtained by directly
comparing the posterior beliefs formed in two scenarios where the information set is identical,
but the rewards associated with one of the states of the world is varied. Our data is well suited
for conducting this exercise.
We do this by considering a comparison of information-set-equivalent posterior beliefs after in-
dividuals have received only (i) the exogenous prior and (ii) a single ball draw.32 This allows
us to test the asymmetric updating hypothesis while remaining agnostic regarding the process
that guides belief updating, testing only whether it is symmetric. Our data allows us to conduct
two comparisons of information-set-equivalent posterior beliefs—a within-subject and a between-
subject comparison.
Firstly, we can compare posterior beliefs, π1, formed with identical information sets {p0, s1} be-
tween treatment groups, where the payments associated with states of the world diﬀer. For ex-
ample, we can compare the average posterior formed after an identical prior, e.g. p0 =
1
6 , and an
identical signal, e.g. s1 = a (i.e. a blue ball), across treatments.
Secondly, we can compare information-set-equivalent posterior beliefs within treatment groups.
This comparison involves comparing π1 after {p0 = p, s1 = s}with 1−π1 after {p0 = 1−p, s1 = sc}
where sc is the complementary signal to s.33 For example, we can compare the posterior, π1,
formed after a prior of p0 =
1
6 and the signal s1 = a (i.e. a blue ball), with 1 − π1 after a
prior of p0 =
5
6 and the signal s1 = b (i.e. a red ball). To see why this comparison involves a
comparison of information-set-equivalent posterior beliefs, recall that the experiment is designed
to be completely symmetric in terms of information, with the information content of a red ball
exactly the same as a blue ball, except in support of the other state of the world. Therefore, if
an individual updates symmetrically, then π1|{p0=p,s1=s} = 1 − π1|{p0=1−p,s1=sc}. This prediction
does not rely on Bayes’ rule (although it is an implication of Bayes’ rule), but rather only requires
symmetric updating, and therefore it provides us with a non-parametric test of the asymmetric
updating hypothesis.
Figure 3 depicts both of these comparisons, with each group of six bars collecting together the
relevant information-set-equivalent groups. Each bar presents the mean posterior belief for that
32i.e. the information set consists of the exogenously assigned prior, p0, and a single signal, s1 ∈ {a, b}.
33Therefore, if s = a then sc = b and vice versa.
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group, as well as a 95% confidence interval around themean.34 Each group is labeled on the x-axis
by the prior belief associated with the ‘red’ bars, which correspond to the information sets that
include a red ball as a signal (i.e. s1 = b). The ‘blue’ bars report the mean of 1−π1, for information
sets containing a blue ball (i.e. s1 = a) and for these bars the x-axis label corresponds to 1− p0.
Within each group, the first two bars represent the average posterior beliefs in T1.Symmetric; the
second pair of bars depict the same for T2.Combined; and the third pair of bars for T3.Separate.
Figure 3: Comparison of Beliefs after the Receipt of a Single Signal and an Exogenous Prior
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The results displayed in Figure 3 show that there are no systematic diﬀerences between posterior
beliefs within information-set-equivalent groups, neither within nor between treatment groups.
Furthermore, when testing non-parametrically whether there are diﬀerences within or between
treatment groups for information-set-equivalent groups, none of the 45 relevant binary compar-
isons35 are significant at the 5 percent significance level under a Mann-Whitney test, suggesting
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the posterior beliefs within information-set-equivalent
groups are drawn from the same distribution. This lends support to the results described above
which indicate that we fail to find evidence in support of the asymmetric updating hypothesis.
34The calculation of these confidence intervals assumes that the data are distributed according to a t-distribution.
35For these comparisons, for each exogenous prior, we test the following binary comparisons: (i) within treatment
group, we test between those that received the s1 = a and s1 = b signals (3× 5 binary comparisons); (ii) for those
that received the same signal, s1, we test between treatment groups (6× 5 binary comparisons).
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Robustness Exercises
In addition to this model-free test, to check for the robustness of the belief updating results for
the average individual presented in Table 3, we conducted several robustness exercises. These
exercises, and their corresponding results, are discussed in detail in Appendix A.
The first exercise examines whether the results from the main specification described in Equation
2 are robust to first diﬀerencing the dependent variable (i.e. this considers how new information
shifts the change in beliefs, imposing the assumption that δ = 1). The second subsection extends
the main empirical specification to allow for individual-specific updating parameters. For both of
these specifications, an ex post power analysis is conducted, reporting the MDE for a significance
level of α = 0.05 and a power of κ = 0.8. The third subsection pools all the observations across the
three treatments together, and then tests whether the average updating parameters diﬀer across
treatments by interacting treatment group dummies with the regressors of the main specification
described in Equation 2.
The results from all of these exercises are highly consistent with those in Table 3 and fail to
provide any evidence in favor of an asymmetry in updating.
Heterogeneity in Updating Behavior
In order to investigate whether the aggregate results are masking heterogeneity in updating be-
havior, we estimate Specification 2 at the individual level and collect the parameters. The distribu-
tions of these individual level parameters are reported in Figure 4. Perhaps the most conspicuous
feature of this figure is the fact that all three treatment groups display such similar parame-
ter distributions in each of the panels - i.e. for each of the parameters. Testing for diﬀerences
between the underlying distributions from which the parameters are drawn in the diﬀerent treat-
ment groups fails to detect any statistically significant diﬀerences in any of the four panels.36 The
upper-right panel shows that the majority of individuals have an estimated δ parameter in the
interval [0.6, 1.1], with a large proportion of these concentrated around 1 in all three treatment
groups. The two left-hand panels show that there is substantially more individual heterogeneity
in the estimated γa and γb parameters, which are dispersed over the interval [0, 3.5] in all three
treatments.
With such a large degree of variation in the individual level parameters, a natural conjecture to
make is that, while we do not observe asymmetric updating at the aggregate level, it is entirely
36More specifically, for each of the four panels in Figure 4, we conducted three binary Mann-Whitney tests compar-
ing each possible pair of treatments. In total, these twelve statistical tests failed to detect any significant diﬀerence
in the underlying parameter distributions between the treatment groups at the 10% level. In addition, another
twenty-four similar tests for diﬀerences in the mean (t-test) and median (chi-squared) of the underlying distribu-
tions between treatments fail to detect any statistically significant diﬀerences at the 10% level.
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plausible that there may be a subsample of individuals who are optimistic updaters and another
subsample of individuals who are pessimistic updaters. If these two subsamples are of a similar
size and their bias is of a similar magnitude, we would observe no asymmetry at the aggregate
level. The lower-right panel of Figure 4 suggests that this is not the case by plotting the distri-
bution of the individual level diﬀerence between the γa and γb parameters. The majority of the
distribution is concentrated in a narrow interval around 0 for all three treatment groups, sug-
gesting that there is no asymmetry for any sizable subsample. Furthermore, this conclusion is
supported by the fact there are no significant diﬀerences between the distributions of updating
parameters observed across the three treatments in any of the four panels, since the motive for a
‘good-news, bad-news’ eﬀect is switched oﬀ in the T1.Symmetric treatment.
Figure 4: Distributions of Individual Level Updating Parameters.
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7 Discussion
7.1 Heterogeneity in results observed in the asymmetric updating litera-
ture
A central question that emerges from the discussion above is why we observe no evidence of a
‘good-news, bad-news’ eﬀect here, while some other influential contributions to this literature
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have found evidence for such an eﬀect. In his excellent chapter in the Handbook of Behavioral
Economics, Benjamin (2019) points out that, more generally, the evidence in this nascent liter-
ature is so far very mixed. In the economics literature, three papers find evidence in favor of
stronger inference from good news: Eil and Rao (2011), Möbius et al. (2014) and Charness and
Dave (2017).37 In contrast, there are three papers that find evidence of stronger inference from
bad news: Ertac (2011), Kuhnen (2015) and Coutts (2019).38 Furthermore, in addition to the
current paper, there are four other papers that find no evidence in favor of a preference-biased
asymmetry in belief updating: Grossman and Owens (2012), Schwardmann and Van der Weele
(2016), Gotthard-Real (2017) and Buser et al. (2018).39 In the psychology literature, however,
there appears to be a near-consensus arguing that there does exist an asymmetry in belief up-
dating in favor of good news (see, e.g., Sharot et al. (2011), Sharot et al. (2012), Kuzmanovic
et al. (2015), and Marks and Baines (2017), amongst others). A notable exception is provided
by Shah et al. (2016) who argue that many of the contributions to this literature suﬀer from
methodological concerns; Garrett and Sharot (2017) oﬀer a rebuttal, claiming that optimistically
biased updating is robust to these concerns.
So far, there seems to be no clear pattern organizing these heterogeneous results. However, be-
low I oﬀer a discussion of some of the candidate explanations for the heterogeneity in observed
results. In general, the candidate explanations for these heterogeneous results fall into two cate-
gories: (1) the hypothesis that contextual factors mediate asymmetric updating: belief updating
is influenced by preferences, but this preference-biased updating is switched on or oﬀ by con-
textual factors. (2) the hypothesis that asymmetric updating is sometimes misidentified: belief
updating is not actually influenced by preferences, but rather, what appears to be asymmetric
updating is driven by a diﬀerent cognitive bias (e.g. pior-biased inference). The majority of the
explanations discussed below fall into the first category.
7.1.1 Information structure
One avenue of enquiry for attempting to reconcile the results is to consider the diﬀerences in the
information structures across experiments. For example, while several of the studies adopt a two-
37Mayraz (2013) also presents evidence in favor of individuals forming motivated beliefs that are distorted towards
more desirable states, however in his experiment one cannot calculate the Bayesian posterior, so it is less comparable
to the other studies in this literature.
38Kuhnen (2015) diﬀers slightly from the other papers in this literature by studying investor learning from financial
information in the domain of gains versus losses (the experimental game is framed as a financial decision). She
finds that investors are especially reactive to bad outcomes in the loss domain, implying that she observes negative
asymmetric updating in the loss domain (and not the gain domain), and overall more pessimistic beliefs in the loss
domain. The implication is that individuals learn diﬀerently in the domain of losses in comparison to the domain of
gains.
39Additionally, while Eil and Rao (2011) found evidence of an asymmetry in favor of good-news in the domain of
beliefs about one’s own Beauty, they did not find evidence of an asymmetry in the domain of beliefs about one’s own
IQ.
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state bookbag-and-poker-chip experimental paradigm, Ertac (2011) uses a three-state structure
with signals that are perfectly informative about one state, and Eil and Rao (2011) consider a
ten-state updating task with binary signals. However, this does not seem to be driving the diﬀer-
ences in results, since we observe heterogeneous results amongst papers with similar information
structures—e.g. restricting attention only to the papers with two-state structures with binary sig-
nals (e.g. the current paper, Möbius et al. (2014), Gotthard-Real (2017), Coutts (2019)) yields
mixed results.
7.1.2 Priors
Focusing only on two-state experiments, there is substantial variation in average prior belief
across experiments, with Coutts (2019) (by design) observing relatively low average priors in
comparison to Möbius et al. (2014), for example. If belief updating is influenced by prior be-
liefs (e.g. a confirmatory bias), then what looks like preference-biased belief updating may be
driven by a completely diﬀerent cognitive deviation from Bayesian updating, namely prior-biased
updating. However, if we look at the papers that find evidence for preference-biased updating,
Charness and Dave (2017) do find evidence in favor of prior-biased updating, while Eil and Rao
(2011) and Möbius et al. (2014) do not find evidence of prior-biased updating.40 This speaks
against the explanation that what appears to be asymmetric belief updating due to preferences is
actually driven by a confirmatory bias.41
7.1.3 Ambiguity
One important dimension that diﬀerentiates the current paper from much of the literature is
that in our experiment subjects are exogenously endowed with accurate point estimate priors, as
opposed to updating from subjectively formed prior beliefs.42 There are advantages and disad-
vantages to this approach. It brings increased experimental control and improved causal iden-
tification, but this comes at the expense of reduced realism and perhaps a slightly less natural
setting.43 However, this discussion highlights a key assumption that is typically made in this liter-
40I refer the interested reader to Benjamin (2019) Section 8 for a more detailed discussion of prior-biased updating.
41A second possible way in which priors can be related to belief updating is through the distribution of signals
observed. For example, compare an individual with a low prior with an individual with a high prior in a typical two-
state experimental framework. The individual with the low prior is also more likely to be in the low state (assuming
beliefs are correlated with the true states). Therefore, in these two-state bookbag-and-poker-chip experiments, the
low prior belief individual is more likely to receive more low signals. This implies that if there is any deviation from
Bayesian updating that is related to the distribution of signals observed, then this can look like a preference-biased
asymmetry in updating when the average prior in the experiment is diﬀerent from 0.5. This point is discussed further
in Coutts (2019). In the current paper, priors and signals are balanced for each individual, alleviating this concern.
42An exception to this is Gotthard-Real (2017), who uses a similar experimental design to the current paper, also
endowing participants with an exogenous prior point belief.
43An interesting recent contribution to the belief updating literature by Le Yaouanq and Schwardmann (2019)
proposes a methodology for studying belief updating in more natural settings, while still maintaining experimental
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ature, namely that subjects are probabilistically sophisticated and therefore have in mind a point
estimate of this probability (or update as if they hold a point estimate prior). In cases where
subjects must form their own subjective prior belief, this assumption is not innocuous. If, in-
stead, the beliefs subjects hold are ambiguous44, then simple Bayesian updating of a single point
estimate may no longer be the most appropriate (normative or descriptive) benchmark. Firstly,
there are several competing theoretical models of belief updating in the presence of ambiguity
with diﬀering predictions, e.g. full Bayesian updating (Jaﬀray, 1989; Pires, 2002) and maximum
likelihood updating (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993), and some recent experimental evidence test-
ing between them (Ngangoue, 2018; Liang, 2019). Secondly, one might postulate that there is
greater scope for motivated reasoning when one is updating beliefs from ambiguous priors (or
ambiguous signals) in comparison to belief updating from exogenously endowed point estimate
priors (and signals with clearly defined informativeness).
However, the existing evidence suggests that the presence or absence of ambiguity is not the pri-
mary explanation for the diﬀering results. Even within the set of papers with home-grown sub-
jective priors (e.g. Eil and Rao (2011), Ertac (2011), Möbius et al. (2014), and Coutts (2019)),
the results are very mixed.
7.1.4 Domain of belief updating
Typically, we treat belief formation as being domain-independent. However, it seems natural to
consider the possibility that humans evolved to process information about their physical envi-
ronment diﬀerently from information about their self and their social environment. For example,
the mental processes involved in forming a belief about the likelihood of future rainfall may be
fundamentally diﬀerent to those involved in forming a strategic belief about the probability that
another individual will be trustworthy in a specific scenario. The latter may involve forming a
mental model of the other individual’s incentives and personal characteristics, and mapping them
into the specific scenario. Some papers in this literature have explored this question by asking
whether we update diﬀerently about a given fundamental characteristic of one’s own self in com-
parison to the same fundamental characteristic of another individual (e.g., Möbius et al. (2014)
and Coutts (2019)). Furthermore, recent theoretical and experimental work has studied how
individuals attribute outcomes to their self versus an external fundamental from their physical or
social environment (see, e.g., Heidhues et al. (2018), Hestermann and Le Yaouanq (2018), and
control and permitting a comparison with Bayesian updating. Their approach is attractive, since it facilitates the
study of belief updating of home-grown priors upon receipt unstructured information that is unobserved by the
experimenter.
44For example, in a typical two-state experiment, I might believe that my chance of being in the top half of an
ability distribution is somewhere between 50 and 70 percent. Even if I don’t have an ambiguous belief, but rather
hold the belief that my chance of being in the top half is uniformly distributed between 50 and 70, there is evidence
that attitudes towards compound lotteries is closely related to attitudes towards ambiguity. (Halevy, 2007)
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Coutts et al. (2019)).
The influence of the domain on belief updating may matter for the asymmetric updating literature
because this literature as a whole considers updating scenarios pertaining to both the environ-
ment (with ‘good’ states typically represented by high monetary payments) and to the self (where
‘good’ states pertain to a desirable individual characteristic).45 One might posit that asymmetric
updating only manifests in certain domains.46 However, even within the group of studies consid-
ering beliefs about the self, the evidence is mixed (e.g. Eil and Rao (2011), Ertac (2011), Möbius
et al. (2014), and Coutts (2019)).
7.1.5 Outcomes and stake size
One caveat to the results reported in the current paper is the financial stakes in play are not
extremely large, and therefore it is feasible that the results would change in the presence of
larger stakes. While small stake sizes are a standard caveat to most laboratory experiments, it is
perhaps a larger concern here, since the asymmetric updating hypothesis may rely on the degree
to which individuals desire the occurance of the good state of the world. However, Coutts (2019)
investigates the role played by stakes, increasing the stake size up to $80 and finds no evidence
that it plays a role. This suggests that stake size may not be a pivotal concern.47 Nonetheless, it
is worth keeping this caveat in mind when interpreting the results.
Overall, the results in this literature appear to be somewhat incongruous, and there doesn’t yet
seem to be a compelling explanation for the observed pattern of behavior observed across studies.
As suggested by Daniel Benjamin (2019), resolving these seeming contradictory results should be
a priority. The current paper adds an incremental contriibution towards this pursuit by demon-
strating the absence of a good-news, bad-news eﬀect in one cell of this contextual matrix—namely,
a context with financial outcomes, minimal ambiguity, and a minimal role for the individual’s ego.
45A closely related, but slightly diﬀerent, taxonomy of the domain space considered in this literature is obtained
by distinguishing domains where an individual’s ego is present from domains in which it is absent. However, for
most of the discussion here, this overlaps closely with the self vs physical environment dichotomy.
46One potential explanation for the diﬀerence in belief updating between the domains of self-image and financial
decision making is the idea that ego maintainance could yield evolutionary benefits. In particular, a positive asym-
metry in updating about one’s self-image would lead to overconfident beliefs, and several authors have posited that
maintaining a high self-confidence may be associated with evolutionary advantages (see, e.g., Bernardo and Welch
(2001); Heifetz et al. (2007); Johnson and Fowler (2011); Burks et al. (2013); Schwardmann and Van der Weele
(2016)). In contrast, asymmetric updating about external states of the world would lead to overoptimism which is
likely to lead to costly mistakes.
47One might argue that even this large monetary stake size is small in comparison to how much individuals care
about their self. However, the heterogeneity within studies focused on beliefs about the self suggest that this is not
a pivotal dimension for switching the good-news, bad-news eﬀect on and oﬀ.
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7.2 Addressing hedging
One inherent challenge in this literature studying belief updating in the presence of state-dependent
stakes is the inherent hedging motive. Various approaches have been adopted to try to deal with
it. Typically, the papers considering belief updating about an ego-related characteristic (e.g. IQ)
rely on the (very reasonable) implicit assumption that hedging across the ego utility andmonetary
utility domains will be minimal.48
Amongst the studies considering monetary state-dependent stakes, two diﬀerent approaches to
dealing with this challenge have been adopted. Coutts (2019) follows the method suggested in
Blanco et al. (2010), which involves partitioning the world such that the participant will either be
paid according to their belief or according to the state-dependent prize, never both. As discussed
by Blanco et al. (2010) and Appendix A in Coutts (2019), this approach has some attractive
theoretical properties. In contrast, in this paper we follow the method developed by Oﬀerman
et al. (2009) and Kothiyal et al. (2011). Both these two approaches are theoretically valid for
alleviating the influence of hedging under the assumptions they make; both approaches have
advantages and drawbacks. However, neither Coutts (2019) nor the current paper finds support
for a larger responsiveness to good-news, which suggests that it is not the case that one of the
two methods is allowing hedging to suppress the over-responsiveness to good-news.
In this paper, we chose to adopt the Oﬀerman et al. (2009)-Kothiyal et al. (2011) method for the
following reasons. Firstly, using QSR incentives facilitates a simple presentation of the incentives
to subjects, potentially enhancing the understanding of the actual incentives faced. Secondly,
under the assumptions discussed in the main text and appendices, the Oﬀerman et al. (2009)-
Kothiyal et al. (2011) method allows one to both correct for any hedging motive present, and
and to measure how large this hedging motive is in a particular incentive environment. Thirdly,
as demonstrated by Blanco et al. (2010), hedging is generally not a major problem unless the
hedging opportunity is transparent. To this end, we introduced the salience manipulation in the
transparency of the hedging motive across our two Asymmetric treatments. As advocated by
Blanco et al. (2010), we see that the degree of hedging diminishes substantially in T3.Separate
when the hedging opportunity is not prominent. This suggests that even the uncorrected beliefs
in T3.Separate are a good approximation for the beliefs subjects hold. However, we also conduct
all of our analysis using the corrected beliefs from each of the T2.Combined and T3.Separate
48For example, this assumes that subjects will not choose to artificially lower their reported belief about having
a high IQ in order to hedge against actually having a low IQ. Möbius et al. (2014) use the crossover mechanism to
ensure there is no hedging motive between the quizz payment and the reported belief, but otherwise rely on this
implicit assumption of no hedging across domains. Eil and Rao (2011) use the QSR and state that they believe that
subjects report their true beliefs since: (i) subjects are likely risk-neutral over the small belief elicitation incentives,
(ii) they are principally told to report their beliefs, (iii) any tendency to hedge is likely to be less important for
studying an asymmetry in belief updating, in comparison to studying the level of beliefs, since the hedging eﬀects
both the priors and the posteriors (and does so irrespective of whether good or bad news is observed). These three
points apply also to the uncorrected beliefs in the current paper.
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treatments. This provides two independent tests of the hypotheses we are testing, each of which
is theoretically valid.
Even given these factors motivating our design choices, the possibility of hedging deserves atten-
tion when interpreting the results. However, when considering the full set of results we observe,
there are several features of the results that suggest that hedging is not a driving factor behind the
absence of a good-news, bad-news eﬀect. The observed absence of any asymmetry in updating
within either of the two Asymmetric treatments for either the uncorrected or corrected beliefs,
as well as the consistency in updating patterns observed across all three treatments is not easily
explained by a combination of a ‘good-news, bad-news’ eﬀect and hedging.
8 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to study belief updating when an individual prefers one state of
the world to another. In particular, the experiment was designed to test the asymmetric updating
hypothesis in the domain of financial decision making, and contribute to the body of work that is
constructing a descriptive understanding of how individuals form beliefs.
The main finding of the current paper is that we find no evidence for asymmetric updating in
our experimental context with financial state-dependent stakes. Instead, we find that the updat-
ing behavior of the average individual is approximately Bayesian, irrespective of the presence or
absence of financial stakes.
The current paper complements the existing work on this topic in several ways. Firstly, we con-
sider belief updating from a wider range of prior beliefs for each individual. Secondly, we demon-
strate how the exogeneity of the priors can be used to conduct empirical exercises that alleviate
endogeneity concerns. Thirdly, our experimental design ensures that the distribution of realised
signals observed is balanced in terms of the frequency of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ signals. This is useful as
it removes the potential influence of the signal distribution that is documented by Coutts (2019).
Fourth, our data allows us to conduct both within subject and between subject tests, as well as
several robustness exercises in support of the main result.
The results described in this paper, and in this nascent literature as awhole, are instructive as there
is a large class of economically important situations in which individuals form beliefs, preferring
one state to another, ranging from capital markets to intertemporal portfolio choice problems
to consumption savings problems. It is clearly important for economists to have an accurate
understanding of how individuals form beliefs in these contexts. However, as described in the
Discussion section above, the results observed in this literature are so far mixed. This paper
contributes evidence towards revealing an accurate descriptive model of belief updating, showing
an absence of the ‘good-news, bad-news’ eﬀect in a context with financial stakes, no ego, and a
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well defined and unambiguous information structure. However, to construct a more complete
model of how we update our beliefs, more evidence is clearly needed.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Robustness Checks
The empirical specification used in the main text of this paper assumes that updating follows the
flexible parametric process described in Equation 1. This specification allows for a wide range of
deviations from Bayes’ rule, as discussed in Section 2. In this section we conduct several exercises
to test for the robustness of the main results.
The first subsection examines whether the results from the main specification described in Equa-
tion 2 are robust to first diﬀerencing the dependent variable (i.e. this considers how new infor-
mation moves the change in beliefs, imposing the assumption that δ = 1). The second subsection
extends the main empirical specification to allow for individual-specific updating parameters.
The third subsection pools all the observations across the three treatments together, and then
tests whether the average updating parameters diﬀer across treatments, by interacting treatment
group dummies with the regressors of the main specification described in Equation 2.
Table 4: First Diﬀerence Specification and Power Calculations
T1: SYMMETRIC T2: COMBINED T3: SEPARATE
OLS IV DIFF OLS IV DIFF OLS IV DIFF
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
δ 0.90 0.99 0.86 0.99 0.93 0.99
(0.03)*** (0.03) (0.04)*** (0.02) (0.02)*** (0.02)
γa 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.06 1.02 1.01 1.16 1.14 1.13
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
γb − γa 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
p(γa = γb) 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.48 0.25 0.25 0.73 0.74 0.75
MDE (κ = 0.8) 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.22
R2 0.73 0.31 0.74 0.21 0.84 0.34
1st Stage F 84.04 107.01 95.45
N 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,140 1,140 1,140
(i) Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level)
(ii) T-tests of H0: δ = 1; γa = 1; γb − γa = 0 indicated by * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%
(iii) MDE reports the minimum detectable eﬀect size for a power of κ.
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Robustness Check 1: First-Diﬀerences Specification and Power Calculation
This section of the robustness checks serves two purposes. The first purpose is to check for the
robustness of the results from the core empirical specification to the use of a first diﬀerences
specification (DIFF), which essentially involves imposing the assumption that δ = 1. The second
purpose of this section is to report the size of the minimum detectable eﬀect (MDE) from power
calculations for both our main OLS and IV empirical specification, and the DIFF specification.
One of the challenges in carrying out a statistical analysis of belief updating behavior is that an
individual’s current posterior belief necessarily depends upon her prior belief, which in turn is
the result of updating in response to past information. Therefore, when estimating a paramet-
ric belief updating function, one concern is that the individual’s prior belief is correlated with
unobservables. In the main text, we devoted substantial space to discussing how the experiment
was designed explicitly to address this concern by generating a completely exogenous information
set, facilitating a natural instrumental variables (IV) approach to estimation. The first diﬀerences
specification results presented here serve to further complement the IV analysis, since the DIFF
specification avoids the potential endogeneity issue by removing the lagged belief from the set of
dependent variables in the regression.
In columns (#a) and (#b), Table 4 repeats the OLS and IV results from Table 3 for the corrected
beliefs, with one minor change to the core specification in Equation 2. Here we report, instead,
the results for the equivalent specification:
π˜i,j,t+1 = δπ˜i,j,t + γaq̂ − (γb − γa)q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + ϵi,j,t+1 (3)
where π˜i,j,t = logit(πi,j,t) and q̂ = log(
q
1−q )·[1(si,j,t = a)−1(si,j,t = b)]; while as above, q˜ = log(
q
1−q );
j refers to a round of decisions; t counts the decision numbers within a round, and the errors
ϵijt+1 are clustered at the individual (i) level. The diﬀerence γb − γa denotes a single parameter
estimated in the regression, but is denoted as the diﬀerence between γb and γa as this is the
natural way to think about this parameter in the context of the discussion above (i.e. the diﬀerence
between how subjects update in response to ‘bad news’ and ‘good news’).
The reason for the rearrangement of the equation is that, while it is equivalent49 to the specifica-
tion in Equation 2, it displays the test of the diﬀerence between γa and γb more clearly (i.e. the
49Notice that the regression coeﬃcients and standard errors on δ and γa are the same in Tables 3 and 4 (where
we are only considering the corrected beliefs). Furthermore, we can see the equivalence from the following simple
rearrangement:
π˜i,j,t+1 = δπ˜i,j,t + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a)− γbq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)
= δπ˜i,j,t + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a)− γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)− γbq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)
= δπ˜i,j,t + γaq˜ · [1(si,j,t+1 = a)− q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)] + [γa − γb] · q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)
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test of the asymmetric updating hypothesis), and thereby also facilitates calculating the MDE. In
Table 3, we have presented the MDE for a power of κ = 0.8.
Columns (#c) report the results for the first diﬀerence specification, which imposes the restriction
that δ = 1:
∆π˜i,j,t+1 = γaq̂ − (γb − γa)q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + ϵi,j,t+1 (4)
where ∆π˜i,j,t+1 = logit(πi,j,t+1)− logit(πi,j,t) and q̂ = log(
q
1−q ) · [1(si,j,t = a)− 1(si,j,t = b)]; j refers
to a round of decisions; t counts the decision numbers within a round, and the errors ϵijt+1 are
clustered at the individual (i) level.
The results indicate that the γb − γa parameter is robust to the diﬀerent empirical specifications
adopted, and also doesn’t vary substantially across treatment groups. In all treatment groups,
and for each of the empirical specifications considered, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
this parameter is equal to zero, which implies that we do not find support for the asymmetric
updating hypothesis. Furthermore, we calculate the MDE for each specification, considering a
significance level of α = 0.05 and a power of κ = 0.8. Under these assumptions, the MDE for the
diﬀerence between the γb and γa parameters in each of the regressions considered in isolation
ranges between 0.22 and 0.27. As a result, we cannot conclusively reject the possibility that there
exists a small asymmetry in updating; however none of our results provide any support for this
conclusion.
Robustness Check 2: Allowing for Individual-Specific Updating Parameters
As discussed above, one reason we might think that endogeneity of the lagged belief could lead
to biased estimates is if there is heterogeneity in individual updating behavior and this leads to a
correlation between the unobserved error term and the lagged belief variable amongst the regres-
sors. We have tried to address this issue above using, firstly, an instrumental variable approach,
and secondly, a first diﬀerences empirical specification. However, since the data were collected
in the form of a panel of belief updates for each individual, the data lends itself to controlling
for individual-specific behavior through exploiting the panel. A typical fixed eﬀects model is not
appropriate here, as it is not the level of the regression that shifts from individual to individual.
However, we can include individual-specific updating parameters to control for the slope to shift
at the individual level. This allows us to extract the individual heterogeneity in how responsive
individuals are to their prior belief, and to new information in general, and reduce the possible
bias in the main parameter of interest, the average diﬀerence in responsiveness to ‘bad news’
and ‘good news’ : γb − γa. With this in mind, our third robustness check involves estimating the
following empirical specification:
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π˜i,j,t+1 = δiπ˜i,j,t + γi q̂ − (γb − γa)q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + ϵi,j,t+1 (5)
where δi and γi are estimated at the individual level, and the remaining parameters and variables
are defined as above. The results from this exercise using the corrected beliefs are reported in
Table 5.
These results are very consistent with the estimates from the core specification, as well as from the
DIFF specification in Robustness Check 2. In summary, all the empirical estimates provide support
for the same underlying story that the data collected in this experiment provide no support for
the asymmetric updating hypothesis in this context.
Table 5: Allowing for Individual-Specific Updating Parameters.
T1 SYMMETRIC T2 COMBINED T3 SEPARATE T2+T3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γb − γa 0.09 0.14 -0.04 0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
p(γa = γb) 0.35 0.18 0.67 0.41
MDE (κ = 0.8) 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.20
MDE (κ = 0.9) 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.23
N 1,075 1,285 1,140 2,425
R2 0.80 0.84 0.89 0.86
(i) Standard errors in parentheses
(ii) T-tests of H0: Coeﬃcient = 0 reported: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%
(iii) MDE reports the minimum detectable eﬀect size for a power of κ.
Robustness Check 3: Between Treatments Comparison of Updating Parameters
This section tests whether the belief updating parameters in our core specification are significantly
diﬀerent between the three treatment groups. This is done by pooling together the three treatment
groups and estimating Equation 2, but with the inclusion of treatment dummies interacted with
the updating coeﬃcients. This provides us with a test of whether the parameters diﬀer between
either of the two asymmetric treatments and symmetric.
More specifically, this involves estimating the following equation:
42
π˜i,j,t+1 =δπ˜i,j,t + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a)− γbq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)+
3∑
k=2
[δkπ˜i,j,t · T
k
i,j,t + γ
k
a q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a) · T
k
i,j,t − γ
k
b q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) · T
k
i,j,t] + ϵi,j,t+1
where T ki,j,t is an indicator variable for treatment k [i.e. T
k
i,j,t = 1(Ti,j,t = k)], with Ti,j,t a treatment
variable taking the values {1, 2, 3} corresponding to the three treatment groups. The coeﬃcients
δ,γa, and γb reflect the baseline parameters without the influence of state-contingent stakes and
the parametersδk, γka and γ
k
b estimate the movement from these parameters for each of the two
state-contingent stake treatments, k ∈ {2, 3}.
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 6. The results show that, for the average in-
dividual, there are no systematic diﬀerences in the updating parameters across treatment groups.
This implies that the diﬀerences in exogenous state-contingent incentives do not exert a strong
influence on how individuals update their beliefs in the diﬀerent treatments.
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Table 6: Testing for Diﬀerences in Average Updating Behavior between Treatment Groups.
Belief 1 Belief 2 Belief 3 Belief 4 Belief 5 Pooled Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Priors
δ 0.93 0.89 1.03 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
δ * T2 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03)
δ * T3 0.02 0.06 -0.10 0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.00
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Signal: Blue (s = a)
γa 0.81 1.02 1.03 1.30 1.28 1.09 0.84
(0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) (0.11) (0.09)
γa * T2 0.09 -0.07 -0.15 -0.08 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01
(0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (0.34) (0.29) (0.15) (0.13)
γa * T3 0.12 -0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.21 0.05 0.04
(0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.28) (0.31) (0.15) (0.13)
Signal: Red (s = b)
γb 0.69 0.79 1.18 1.40 1.80 1.16 0.78
(0.11) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.11) (0.09)
γb * T2 0.21 0.06 -0.33 -0.21 0.14 -0.04 0.11
(0.20) (0.22) (0.25) (0.27) (0.40) (0.17) (0.15)
γb * T3 0.30 0.04 -0.15 -0.37 -0.06 -0.05 0.10
(0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (0.25) (0.33) (0.15) (0.12)
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 3,500 5,550
Kleibergen-Paap F 46.61 47.46 56.63 60.45 64.03 93.17 53.88
(i) Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
(ii) Estimates use the corrected beliefs and are instrumented using the correct lagged Bayesian posterior.
(iii) All of the non-interacted coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 1% level. Only one of
the forty-two interaction coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level. This is the γb
* T3 coeﬃcient in the Belief 1 column, which is significant at the 10%, but not the 5% level.
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Appendix B.1: Core Properties of Bayes’ Rule
Möbius et al. (2014) argue that the core structure of Bayesian updating is captured by the fol-
lowing three properties:
1. invariance, whereby the diﬀerence in logit beliefs between t and t+ 1 depends only on the
history of signals, Ht+1, and the initial prior, p0 (i.e. on the agent’s information set). An
updating process is invariant if we can find a function gt such that:
logit(πt+1)− logit(πt) = gt(st+1, st, ..., s1; p0)
If an individual displayed base rate neglect or confirmatory bias, this would constitute a
violation of invariance (i.e. in the context of the model outlined in the main text, this
assumption stipulates that δ = 1).
2. πt is a suﬃcient statistic for all information received at time t or earlier, such that the change
in logit beliefs depends only on the new information in time t+ 1: logit(πt+1)− logit(πt) =
gt(st+1)
3. stability of the updating process over time. This property is satisfied if gt = g for all t.
Under the assumption that these properties are satisfied, the authors note that the class of updat-
ing processes that remain can be fully described by the two parameter function, g(st), where:
g(st) = log(
q
1− q
) · 1(st+1 = a)− log(
q
1− q
) · 1(st+1 = b)
This serves to motivate the model described in Equation 1.
Appendix B.2.1: The QSR and a Non-EU ‘Truth Serum’
In this section, we discuss how beliefs reported under the QSR might be distorted, and how we
address this challenge. Consider the binary event, denoted by Eω, where ω ∈ {A,B}. Therefore,
EA refers to the event that state ω = A is realized. The object that we would like to elicit is
the participant’s belief, πt = P (EA) = P (ω = A), regarding the likelihood that state ω = A is
the correct state at time t. However, the object that we will observe is the participant’s reported
belief, rt, at each point in time under the incentives prescribed by the quadratic scoring rule. The
Quadratic Scoring Rule at time t is defined by:
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SA(rt) = 1− (1− rt)
2 (6)
SB(rt) = 1− r
2
t (7)
where rt is the reported probability of eventEA occurring; SA(rt) is the payment if the state ω = A
is realized; SB(rt) is the payment if the state ω = B is realized. Therefore, the QSR essentially
involves a single choice from a list of binary prospects, (1 − (1 − rt)2)EA(1 − r
2
t ). The QSR is a
‘proper’ scoring rule since, if the agent is a risk neutral EU maximizer then she is incentivized to
truthfully reveal her belief, πt:
πt = arg max
rtϵ[0,1]
πtSA(rt) + (1− πt)SB(rt)
However, the QSR is no longer incentive compatible once we allow for (i) risk aversion / loving and
(ii) participants who have exogenous stakes in the state of the world. The reasons for this are the
following. Firstly, it has been well documented theoretically that, if the participant is risk averse,
then the QSR leads to reporting of beliefs, rt, that are distorted towards 0.5, away from her true
belief, πt, when the participant has no exogenous stakes in the realized state.50 This distortion
has been observed in experimental data (Oﬀerman et al., 2009; Armantier and Treich, 2013).
Secondly, in our experiment, we will also be interested in eliciting beliefs when participants have
an exogenous stake associated with one of the two states. More precisely, we will be interested in
recovering the participant’s true belief when she receives an exogenous payment, x, if state ω = A
is realized. This payment, x, is in addition to the payment she receives from the QSR. In other
words, she will choose from a menu of binary prospects of the form: (x+1− (1− rt)2)EA(1− r
2
t ).
In the context of state-dependant stakes, a risk averse EU maximizer51 will face two distortionary
motives in reporting her belief: (i) she will face the motive to distort her belief towards 0.5 as
discussed above; and (ii) in addition, there is a hedging motive, which will compel a risk averse
individual to lower her reported belief, rt, towards zero as x increases.
If the participants in our experiment are risk neutral expected utility maximizers, the reported be-
liefs, rt, that we elicit under the QSR will coincide with their true beliefs, πt. However, in order to
allow for choice behaviors consistent with a wider range of decision models, we will measure the
size of the distortionary influence of the elicitation incentives at an individual level and correct the
50i.e. if πt > 0.5 then πt > rt > 0.5, and if πt < 0.5 then πt < rt < 0.5 for a risk averse individual reporting her
beliefs under QSR incentives.
51A participant who is a risk averse EU maximizer will choose her reported belief rt by solving the following
maximization problem:
max
rtϵ[0,1]
πtU(x+ 1− (1− rt)
2) + (1− πt)U(1− r
2
t )
46
beliefs accordingly. This approach is valid under the weak assumption that individuals evaluate
binary prospects according to the biseparable preferences52 model and are probabilistically sophis-
ticated.53 This restriction on behavior is very weak and includes individuals who behave according
to EU with any risk preferences as well as the majority of commonly used NEU models.54
A Non-EU ‘Truth Serum’
The discussion above has highlighted how beliefs might be distorted under QSR incentives. The
Oﬀerman et al. (2009) approach proposes correcting the reported beliefs for the risk aversion
caused by the curvature of the utility function or by non-linear probability weighting. This ap-
proach involves eliciting participants’ reported belief parameter, r, for a set of risky events where
they know the objective probability, p (known probability). This is done under precisely the same
QSR incentive environment in which we elicit the participants’ subjective beliefs, π, regarding the
events of interest (where they don’t know the objective probability: unknown probability). If a
subject’s reported beliefs, r, diﬀer from the known objective probabilities, p, this indicates that
the subject is distorting her beliefs due to the incentive environment (e.g. due to risk aversion).
The objective of the correction mechanism is therefore to construct a map, R, from the objec-
tive beliefs, p ∈ [0, 1], to the reported beliefs, r, for each individual under the relevant incentive
environment.
Oﬀerman et al. (2009) show that under the assumption that individuals evaluate prospects in
a way that is consistent with the weak assumptions of the biseparable preferences model, then in
the scenario where there are no state-contingent stakes (i.e. x = 0), individuals evaluate the
QSR menu of prospects (1 − (1 − rt)2)EA(1 − r
2
t ) according to w(P (EA))U(1 − (1 − rt)
2) + (1 −
w(P (EA)))U(1− r2t ) for rt ≥ 0.5 and therefore the inverse of the map from objective probabilities
52The biseparable preference model holds if the preference ordering, !, over prospects of the form, yEz, can be
represented by:
yEz →W (E)U(y) + (1−W (E))U(z)
where U is a real-valued function unique up to level and unit; and W is a unique weighting function, satisfying
W (∅) = 0, W (S) = 1 and W (E) ≤ W (F ) if E ⊆ F . S is the set of all states and events are subsets of the full set
of states: i.e. E,F ⊆ S. In this paper, we only consider two-state prospects, where the state-space is partitioned
into two parts by an event, E and its complement Ec. Making the further assumption that the decision maker is
probabilistically sophisticated gives the following refinement:
yEz → w(P (E))U(y) + (1− w(P (E)))U(z)
53Probabilistic sophistication is the assumption that we can model that individual’s preferences over prospects as
if the individual’s beliefs over states can be summarized by a probability measure, P . In other words, probabilistic
sophistication implies that we can model the individual’s belief regarding the likelihood of an event E as being
completely summarized by a single probability judgment, P (EA).
54Amongst the models subsumed within the biseparable preferences model are EU, Choquet expected utility
(Schmeidler, 1989), maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), prospect theory (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992), and α-maxmin expected utility (Ghirardato et al., 2004). See Oﬀerman et al. (2009) for a discussion.
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to reported probabilities, R, is given by:
p = R−1(r) = w−1
⎛⎝ r
r + (1− r)U
′(1−(1−r)2)
U ′(1−r2)
⎞⎠ (8)
In Appendix B.2.2, we provide a derivation for this equation, as well as augmenting the Oﬀerman
et al. (2009) approach to allow for the scenario where there are state-contingent stakes (i.e.
x ≠ 0). This extension to Oﬀerman et al. (2009) represents a special case of the more general
treatment of correction methods for binary proper scoring rules considered by Kothiyal et al.
(2011). In our empirical analysis, we discuss how we use Equation 8 to recover the function, R,
for each individual and thereby recover their beliefs, πt, from their reported beliefs, rt.
Appendix B.2.2: Augmenting the Oﬀerman et al. (2009) ‘Truth
Serum’ Approach to Include Stakes
The previous section discussed the central ideas motivating the Oﬀerman et al. (2009) approach
for correcting for hedging in cases where there are no state-dependent stakes (i.e. x = 0). In
projects studying the asymmetric updating hypothesis, allowing for state-dependent stakes (i.e.
x ≠ 0) is of fundamental importance. Therefore, in this section, we consider an extension to the
Oﬀerman et al. (2009) approach to correcting for hedging. The extension we consider is tailored
specifically to our experimental setting, however it is a special case of the more general set of
correction techniques studied by Kothiyal et al. (2011).55
In the case where x ≠ 0, the text above discussed how participants who face the quadratic scor-
ing rule incentives, along with the non-zero state-contingent bonus x, essentially face a choice
from a menu of lotteries denoted by (x + 1 − (1 − rt)2)EA(1 − r
2
t ). An individual who satisfies
the biseparable preferences model and is probabilistically sophisticated will evaluate this prospect
using the following Equations:56
For x ≥ 1 or rt ≥ 0.5 :
w(P (EA))U(x+ 1− (1− rt)
2) + (1− w(P (EA)))U(1− r
2
t ) (9)
55Kothiyal et al. (2011) extend the basic idea used by techniques aiming to correct elicited beliefs for reporting
bias (e.g. hedging) to apply to the set of all binary proper scoring rules, and cover the full domain of beliefs. In
conjunction with Oﬀerman et al. (2009), this paper therefore oﬀers a useful set of tools for accessing subjects’ true
beliefs in situations where they may have reason to distort their reports.
56For expositional simplicity, we don’t consider x ∈ (0, 1). The discussion below is easily extended to these cases,
but they are irrelevant for the purposes of this paper. This case is slightly diﬀerent due to the fact that the probability
weights on events or states may depend on their ordinal ranking according to preferences in this model.
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and similarly,
For x = 0 & rt < 0.5 :
(1− w(P (EcA)))U(x+ 1− (1− r)
2
t ) + w(P (E
c
A))U(1− r
2
t ) (10)
The reason for the two separate conditions is due to the way in which many NEU models, sub-
sumed within biseparable preferences model, allow the probability weighting function, w(.), over
events to be influenced by the ordinal ranking over the associated outcomes, from best to worst57.
Since the case where x = 0 is discussed extensively in Oﬀerman et al. (2009), we will focus on the
case where x ≥ 1 in the discussion that follows. This case only requires a very minor adjustment
to their discussion. The key results are the following (adjusted to include the influence of x):
Result 1: Under NEU with known probabilities, p, the optimal reported probability, r = Rx(p)
satisfies:
If x ≥ 1,then p = R−1x (rt) = w
−1
⎛⎝ rt
rt + (1− rt)
U ′(x+1−(1−rt)2)
U ′(1−r2
t
)
⎞⎠ (11)
Result 2: Under NEU with unknown probabilities, the optimal reported probability, r, satisfies:
If x ≥ 1,then P (E) = w−1
⎛⎜⎝ rt
rt + (1− rt)
U ′(x+1−(1−r)2
t
)
U ′(1−r2
t
)
⎞⎟⎠ (12)
This motivates the simple strategy for recovering the agent’s subjective beliefs from her reported
beliefs under the specific incentive environment that she faces. Since the RHS of (11) and (12)
agree, we have:
P (E) = R−1x (r) (13)
which implies that if we can recover the function R−1x then we can map the reported beliefs to the
participant’s subjective beliefs. Equation 11 shows that we can recover this R−1x function in the
same way here, with the bonus payment of x, as in the case where x = 0 considered in Oﬀerman
et al. (2009). Essentially, we provide the participant with prospects over known probabilities, p,
and ask them for their belief regarding the likelihood that one state will be realized. In order to
ensure the incentives to distort one’s reported beliefs are kept constant, we do this exercise under
precisely the same incentive environment as in the main belief updating task. By eliciting these
57When x = 0 and rt < 0.5, then 1− r2t > 1− (1− rt)
2 (i.e. in this case, EcA becomes the preferred event, rather
than EA, and therefore the probability weighting function is reversed).
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reported beliefs associated with known probabilities spanning the whole unit interval, we can
use these (p, rt) pairs to estimate Rx(p) for each individual for the relevant incentive environment
created by the belief elicitation. Having estimated Rx(p), we can calculate its inverse, R−1x (r).
We can take any beliefs reported by the participant under the same belief elicitation incentives
and then use this estimated R−1x (r) to recover her true beliefs. In particular, we can use this
estimated function to recover her true beliefs from her reported beliefs in the belief updating task
that is the focus of this paper. Essentially, we are using this procedure to remove any misreporting
eﬀect that the belief elicitation incentive environment may have. It allows us to correct for the
possibility that individuals may hold some belief P (E) or π, but instead report a diﬀerent belief,
r.
If the incentive environment does not cause the participant to report a belief diﬀerent from her
true belief, then this procedure is unnecessary, but applying the procedure to her reported beliefs
will not have any eﬀect. In this case, the corrected beliefs will be the same as the reported beliefs.
Appendix B.2.3: Calibration of the Belief Correction Procedure:
Theory
It is clear from the discussion in the main text and Equation 8, that we could recover R(.) non-
parametrically for each individual if we were to collect a large number of (p, r) pairs from partic-
ipants, such that the interval between the known probabilities, p, is suﬃciently small. However,
since it is not practical here to elicit such a large number of observations from each participant,
we instead impose a parametric structure similar to the one used by Oﬀerman et al. (2009).
For the utility function, U(.), we use the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)58 functional form:
U(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
xρ if ρ > 0
ln x if ρ = 0
−xρ if ρ < 0
(14)
For the probability weighting function, w(.), we adopt Prelec’s (1998), one-parameter family59:
58It is worth noting that the name “constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)” is not appropriate here as risk attitudes
are also captured in the probability weighting function.
59This is a special case of Prelec’s two-parameter family of weighting functions:
w(p) = exp[−β(− ln(p))α]
For the purposes of the current context, the two-parameter family is not practically suitable due to the limited
data we use at the individual level. This functional form permits the standard inverse-S shaped probability weighting
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w(p) = exp[−(− ln(p))α] (15)
Substituting these parametric functional form specifications into Equation 8 for the case where
x = 0 gives:
p = R−1(rt) = exp
⎛⎝− [− ln( rt(2rt − r2t )1−ρ
rt(2rt − r2t )1−ρ + (1− rt)(1− r
2
t )1−ρ
)] 1
α
⎞⎠ (16)
For the the case where x ≠ 0, substituting these parametric functional form specifications de-
scribed in Equations 14 and 15 into Equation 11 gives:
p = R−1x (rt) = exp
⎛⎝− [− ln( rt(1− (1− rt)2 + x)1−ρ
rt(1− (1− rt)2 + x)1−ρ + (1− rt)(1− r2t )1−ρ
)] 1
α
⎞⎠ (17)
We therefore use this adapted specification for our correction mechanism for the combined and
separate treatment groups.
In our core analysis, for our individual level reported belief corrections, we will make the simpli-
fying assumption that α = 1, such that risk aversion is captured only through the curvature of
the utility function and not through the probability weighting function. The results are similar
when we use Prelec’s one parameter weighting function. Furthermore, it is substantially easier
to interpret the risk aversion parameter estimates when we estimate ρ alone, due to the strong
relationship between the ρ and α estimates .
We therefore estimate the following model, for each participant, in order to acquire a numerical
estimate for the inverse of this function, R(.):
logit[R(j/20)] = logit[h(j/20,α, ρ)]+ uj (18)
where R(j/20) is the probability reported by the individual that corresponds to true known prob-
ability, p = j20 where 1 ≤ j ≤ 19
60. As discussed above, α is the parameter of the probability
weighting function; ρ gives the curvature of the utility function. The function h(.) is the inverse
of R−1. We estimate this function, h(.) numerically at each step61 within the maximum likelihood
estimation. The error terms, uj, are independently and identically distributed across participants
function that has been found to be consistent with the majority of the existing empirical evidence. When β = 1 in the
one-parameter family, the α parameter captures the degree of curvature of the inverse-S shape but the point at which
w(p) intersects the 45 degree line is predetermined. Adding the second parameter, β, extends the one-parameter
specification by allowing this fixed point to vary.
60In other words, for known probabilities, p, between 0.05 and 0.95 at intervals of 0.05.
61i.e. given the current parameter guesses.
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and choices and are drawn from a normal distribution. Essentially, here we are using each partic-
ipant’s 20 (r, p) pairs in order to estimate an R function that reflects the distortion in her reported
beliefs due to the particular quadratic scoring rule incentive structure that she is subject to. No-
tice, that this structure varies across treatments as x varies and therefore the same subject would
require a diﬀerent adjustment curve if she were reassigned to a diﬀerent treatment.
Using these estimates at an individual level allows us to recover the participants’ true subjective
beliefs, πt, from the first stage of the experiment in which they report their beliefs, rt, regarding
the likelihood of ω = A being the true state. In Figure 6 in the main text, we graph the individual
level correction curve estimates for two individuals in each treatment group. It is clear from these
examples, firstly, that individuals in the sample are distorting their reported beliefs substantially
relative to the known probabilities, and secondly, that the estimated correction curves are suﬃ-
ciently flexible to fit diﬀerent types of belief distortion behavior reasonably well. Furthermore,
importantly, the graph in the top-left panel of the figure shows that, when an individual accurately
reports her beliefs, then the correction mechanism has no harmful eﬀect.
At the aggregate level, for each treatment group, T ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we estimate:
logit[Ri(j/20)] = logit[hi(j/20,α, ρ)]+ ui,j (19)
where j indexes the 20 reported probabilities of individual i. This specification allows us to ex-
amine the distortion caused by the incentive environment to the average individual in each of the
three treatment groups.
Appendix B.2.4: Calibration of the Belief Correction Procedure:
Estimation
The belief correction procedure that we adopt involves assuming a flexible parametric form for
the participants’ utility and probability weighting functions in order to estimate the R function
discussed in Equation 8 above. We estimate this function for each individual separately in order
to correct the reported beliefs at the individual level. In addition, we estimate this function at
the aggregate level for each of the treatment groups in order to obtain a measure of the average
distortion of the incentive environment faced in each of the treatment groups. A detailed discus-
sion of the mechanics of the Belief Correction Procedure we use is provided in Appendix B.2.3
above. Essentially, we are simply fitting a curve through each subject’s belief elicitation incentive
distortion.
Figure 5 displays the average correction curves for each of the treatment groups, fitting a sin-
gle curve to the reported belief data observed across all subjects in the relevant treatment group.
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Comparing the three subgraphs, we see that the average individual distorts the beliefs she reports
in a way that is consistent with what risk aversion under EU would predict, with the inverse-S
shape distortion in the T1.Symmetric stakes treatment and the strong distortion downwards
(away from the more desirable state) in both of the Asymmetric stakes treatments. Further-
more, we see that the diﬀerent ways of framing the same incentives in the two Asymmetric
treatments has a clear influence on behavior. In T2.Combined, the participants hedge far more
when choosing their reported beliefs in comparison to those in the T3.Separate group. This is
in spite of the fact that the incentives are identical in these two treatments. This indicates that
the reported beliefs in the T3.Separate treatment are closer to the participants’ true beliefs and
motivates this presentation of incentives as preferable for future work that calls for the elicitation
of beliefs when there are exogenous state-contingent payments.
At the individual level, there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the degree to which individuals
distorted their reported belief away from their actual belief, given the incentive environment. Fig-
ure 6 displays the correction curves estimated for two individuals from each treatment group. It is
clear from this figure that some individuals responded very strongly to the incentive environment
in which their belief was elicited, while others reported their belief more accurately. The belief
correction procedure is therefore very helpful for recovering the true beliefs of participants who
responded strongly to the incentive environment. In cases where the individual simply reported
their belief accurately, the corrected beliefs and the reported beliefs are exactly the same.
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Figure 5: Average Correction Functions across Treatments.
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Figure 6: Individual Level Estimates of the Incentive Correction Function.
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Appendix C: Endogeneity: An Illustrative Example
This section provides a simple illustrative example of why it is important to exercise caution in
addressing possible endogeneity issues when studying belief updating. In particular, in many
instances we are interested in studying how individuals update their beliefs from home-grown
prior beliefs (i.e. subjective prior beliefs that are not exogenously endowed to subjects). However,
when studying how subjects update beliefs from a home-grown prior, it is important to pay care-
ful attention to the possible endogenous relationships between: (i) individual updating types,
(ii) states of the world, and (iii) prior beliefs.62 In the illustrative example I discuss below, I con-
sider the implications of a relationship between (i) and (ii), allowing for (iii) to be completely
exogenous.
One domain where studying belief updating from home-grown priors is essential is the domain
of beliefs about the self. Beliefs about one’s self deserve special attention since they are of critical
importance in guiding our interaction with the world around us. This set of beliefs are also of
central importance to the literature considering the good-news, bad-news hypothesis, since these
beliefs are often heavy in aﬀect, and are amongst the beliefs that we care most about.
However, when we study belief updating from subjective priors, there is a danger that an indi-
viduals prior beliefs are related to the way she updates her beliefs. Furthermore, if the beliefs
pertain to her self, her prior belief may be related to this fundamental, implying that the distri-
bution of signals she receives is related to this fundamental and to her prior. This is true even if
the individual receives “exogenous” noisy signals about the fundamental.
The following discussion has the objective of illustrating one possible way in which neglecting to
pay attention to the endogeneity of the signal distribution can be problematic. The example is
purely hypothetical, and rather contrived, but serves to illustrate the basic point. In particular, I
use a very simple “toy” simulation to demonstrate that ignoring this issue can (in principal) lead
to mistakenly find evidence for asymmetric updating when all individuals update symmetrically.
It is important to point out that I am not suggesting that this is the explanation for asymmetric
updating results observed in the literature63 - I am simply highlighting a potential issue that
should be addressed in this literature going forwards. In this regard, I also suggest a simple
solution for dealing with the issue.
Much of the belief updating literature considers situations that resemble the following basic struc-
ture: consider an agent who updates about two states of theworld, ω ∈ {High, Low}, and receives
a sequence of noisy signals, st ∈ {UP,DOWN}. This also reflects the setup considered in the
62In some cases, e.g. when forming beliefs about the self, there are diﬀerences across individuals in the fundamen-
tal (ii) that they are forming beliefs about. In these cases, the relationship between (i) and (iii) might be mediated
by a natural relationship between the fundamental (ii) and the priors.
63For example, Figure 3 in Möbius et al. (2014) suggests that this is probably not a major concern for their main
results. However, it is still important to control for this potential endogeneity issue as a robustness check.
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current paper. However, since it is important to also understand how we form beliefs about self,
in some studies the states are determined by personal characteristics of the individual (e.g. IQ).
This means that states are essentially equivalent to personal types (i.e. states = types). The im-
plication of this is that if signals are informative about the state of the world, then High types are
more likely than Low types to receive Up signals (and vice versa for Down signals). If High types
update their beliefs diﬀerently from Low types, this can (in principal) lead to finding (what looks
like) evidence that the average individual updates asymmetrically when no individual actually
does.
In order to show this, I conduct a very simple simulation exercise. I construct a population of 10
000 individuals who are randomly assigned to one of two types, ω ∈ {High, Low}. Within each
type, the agents’ prior beliefs about the likelihood of being the High type are assigned randomly
using a uniform distribution, distributed between zero and one.64 High types receive an Up signal
with probability q = 58 and Low types receive a Down signal with probability q =
5
8 . Using a seed
of 1000 in STATA, the observed empirical distribution of signals across types is shown in Figure
7.
Figure 7: Frequencies of Signals by Type
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Now, the important part of this story is that belief updating may (in principal) be related to the
underlying fundamental of interest. For example, it is conceivable that high IQ individuals process
information and update their beliefs diﬀerently from low IQ individuals.65
64Note, this is an unrealistic assumption. In general, prior beliefs are related to the true state of the world. For
example, beliefs about one’s rank in an IQ distribution tend to be correlated with one’s actual rank. However, for the
purposes of this illustration, constructing type and prior belief to be orthogonal allows us to isolate only the eﬀect
of the endogeneity of types and signals (with exogenous priors). Allowing for priors to be related to the underlying
fundamental would add an additional layer of endogeneity issues.
65Note, even if one doesn’t find the story that the two types (here, High and Low) might update their beliefs dif-
ferently compelling, a very similar pattern could also be generated if there is a relationship between prior beliefs and
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Here, we consider two types that use diﬀerent, but always symmetric, updating rules. In particular,
we consider a High type that is perfectly Bayesian, and a Low type that is not very responsive to
new information (but otherwise very well behaved her belief updating).66
The High type updates according to the following rule (δ = 1, γUP = 1, γDOWN = 1):
logit(πt+1) = 1 · logit(πt) + 1 · log(
5
3
) · 1(st+1 = UP )− 1 · log(
5
3
) · 1(st+1 = DOWN) (20)
The Low type updates according to the following rule (δ = 1, γUP = 0.2, γDOWN = 0.2):
logit(πt+1) = 1 · logit(πt) + (0.2) · log(
5
3
) · 1(st+1 = UP )− (0.2) · log(
5
3
) · 1(st+1 = DOWN) (21)
However, if we as the analyst neglect the possibility that the two types update their beliefs dif-
ferently, then we might obtain biased parameters. This is illustrated by the regression estimates
presented in column 1 and 2 of Table 7 below. These columns reflect the estimates from the
standard specification used in this literature (i.e. equation 2). These parameter estimates, along
with the true population averages are summarised as follows:
True Parameter Values (Population Ave.) Estimates
δ 1 1
γUP 0.6 0.7
γDOWN 0.6 0.5
It is clear from this that in spite of the fact that there is not a single individual in this population
who updates asymmetrically that the estimated parameters suggest that there is an asymmetry.
Notice, the standard errors are small and the adjusted R2 suggests a good model fit (see Table
updating. This follows because: (i) prior beliefs about one’s self are typically related to the underlying fundamental
in question (e.g. beliefs about one’s IQ positively correlated with actual IQ), (ii) types are mechanically related to
the distribution of signals in the class of experiments we’re considering, and therefore (iii) prior beliefs are related
to the distribution of signals observed. Therefore, the story described in this section is worth paying attention to in
any situation where at least one of the following might be violated:
(1) states of the world ⊥ belief updating and (2) priors ⊥ belief updating
66Note, neither of the typesmakes any errors in their belief updating. They both follow their updating rule perfectly.
This exercise therefore rules out several other channels that can make life challenging for the analyst (e.g. errors
related to priors or types).
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7). As mentioned above, this is simply an illustration of why it is important to pay attention to
the relationship between the distribution of signals and the types. Furthermore, it is important to
point out that one can make an similar argument to show that even if the majority of individuals
in the population are asymmetric updaters that the neglect of a relationship between signals and
types could (in principal) generate estimates that suggest symmetric updating.
Fortunately, this particular endogeneity issue is easy to deal with by simply considering updating
behavior within each type (e.g. interacting the RHS variables of equation 2 with the Type dummy
variable). This is illustrated in column 3 of Table 7. Notice, also, that simply including the Type
dummy variable in the regression does not solve the problem (see column 2).
Table 7: Estimates of Simulated Data Parameters
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3)
δ 1.002 1.002 1.000
(0.001) (0.001) (.)
γUP 0.696 0.683 0.200
(0.005) (0.007) (.)
γDOWN 0.504 0.513 0.200
(0.006) (0.006) (.)
High Type (=1) 0.0114
(0.004)
High Type (=1) * δ 0.000
(.)
High Type (=1) * γUP 0.800
(.)
High Type (=1) * γDOWN 0.800
(.)
N 10000 10000 10000
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99 1.00
(i) Standard errors in parentheses
(ii) Note: Std errors in column 3 missing due to perfect fit.
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Appendix D: Supplementary Figures, Results and Experimental
Instructions
Figure 8: Comparison of Initial (Period 0) Belief with the Exogenous Prior
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Table 8: First Stage Regressions Output Associated with Table 3
T1: SYMMETRIC T2: COMBINED T3: SEPARATE
Reported Corrected Reported Corrected Reported Corrected
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
δIV 0.81 0.82 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.85
(0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)***
γa -0.07 -0.07 -0.60 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09
(0.11) (0.10) (0.22)*** (0.20) (0.25) (0.25)
γb -0.17 -0.20 0.34 -0.20 -0.24 -0.21
(0.10)* (0.11)* (0.20)* (0.17) (0.23) (0.26)
Kleibergen Paap F 170.39 228.03 238.80 256.15 220.64 276.53
Shea Partial R2 0.58 0.61 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.49
N 1,075 1,075 1,285 1,285 1,140 1,140
(i) Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
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Table 9: Testing for Sample Balance Across Treatment Groups
T1 SYMMETRIC T2 COMBINED T3 SEPARATE D(2,1) D(3,1) D(3,2)
Gender (Male = 1) 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.02 0.02 0
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age 22.88 23.02 21.88 0.14 -0.99 -1.13
(3.46) (4.47) (3.11)
Location (London = 1) 0.51 0.48 0.52 -0.03 0.01 0.04
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Economics Class 0.44 0.54 0.42 0.10 -0.02 -0.12
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Home Language German 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.03 -0.00 -0.03
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Home Language English 0.28 0.20 0.38 -0.08 0.10 0.18**
(0.45) (0.40) (0.49)
Cognitive Reflection Score 2.07 2.02 2.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.03
(0.94) (0.93) (1.05)
N 57 65 60
(i) Standard deviations in parentheses
(ii) T-test for diﬀerence being significant: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%
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Table 10: Average Updating Behavior across Treatments (Full Sample)
T1: SYMMETRIC T2: COMBINED T3: SEPARATE
Reported Corrected Reported Corrected Reported Corrected
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
OLS
δ 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.86
(0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)***
γa 0.95 0.92 0.86 0.91 1.00 0.93
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
γb 0.83 0.78 0.99 0.90 0.96 0.91
(0.10)* (0.10)** (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
p (H0 : γa = γb) 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.90 0.64 0.80
N 1,875 1,875 1,850 1,850 1,825 1,825
R2 0.52 0.51 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.70
IV
δ 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.99 1.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)** (0.02) (0.02)
γa 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.95 0.88
(0.09) (0.09)* (0.10) (0.09)* (0.11) (0.09)
γb 0.82 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.88
(0.09)* (0.09)** (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08)
p (H0 : γa = γb) 0.47 0.44 0.83 0.51 0.74 0.98
N 1,875 1,875 1,850 1,850 1,825 1,825
1st Stage F 70.89 82.63 82.83 82.45 54.72 59.90
(i) Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
(ii) All coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 1% level. Therefore, t-tests of the null
hypothesis (H0: Coeﬃcient = 1) are reported: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
(iii) The rows corresponding to p (H0 : γa = γb) report the p-statistic from a t-test of the equality
of the coeﬃcients γa and γb (i.e. a test of the asymmetric updating hypothesis).
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